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The key flaw to the United States' approach to rule of law
development is routinely including the "standard menu" of rule of law
development assistance as a part of the overall development effort
without regard to whether the recipient country is at a developmental
stage where it is able to absorb some or all of this type of aid. This
article uses Afghanistan as a case study. Despite a decade of assistance,
Afghanistan remains a fragile and conflict-affected country, thus raising
concerns about the value of the aid given and whether rule of law
development aid should continue to be a part of the standard aid package
in similarly situated countries. This article also reports the results of a
small-scale survey of rule of law development workers in Afghanistan
who were universally critical of rule of law development efforts in
Afghanistan.
This article concludes that the experience in Afghanistan
demonstrates the need to change how the United States approaches rule
of law development assistance. The United States should no longer
routinely include rule of law development assistance in developmental
aid packages. Instead, the United States should analyze the current
conditions in a particular country and determine whether that country is
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ready for rule of law development assistance. This analysis should
consider economic, political, and social development, and whether the
country is currently in armed conflict. Depending on the level of
development, it might make better sense for limited rule of law
assistance. In some countries, it might be better to provide no rule of law
assistance and instead to focus on other development goals and advocate
for rule of law development at a political level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Think about life in the average underdeveloped country. In that
country, most people barely subsist by farming or day labor. The
average life is cut short by diseases that are easily treated in more
developed parts of the world. Babies die before they grow up. Women
die in childbirth. If that underdeveloped country is in the midst of armed
conflict, young men die fighting. In such conflict-affected countries,
people regularly fear being in the wrong place at the wrong time and
being killed. The roads are poor or nonexistent. The lack of roads
makes it hard for most people to go to the next town or city to visit their
family or to find better jobs. Most people are illiterate. They get their
news from the radio, or not at all. They live without electricity or easy
access to clean drinking water. Daily life is difficult for the average
citizen of the average struggling third world country.
The first world, including the United States, has aid programs that
are intended to improve the quality of life for people living in these
conditions. In the middle of the last century, these aid programs focused
on building roads, building bridges, digging wells, providing basic
healthcare (such as vaccinations), and improving basic education.1
Slowly, these aid programs moved away from the basics, in part because
of the concern that providing these basics was not enough. 2 Put simply,
the idea started to develop that, to have a better economy, there needed to
1. See, e.g., ROGER C. RIDDELL, DOES FOREIGN AID REALLY WORK? 21-33 (2007);
CAROL LANCASTER, TRANSFORMING FOREIGN AID: UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE IN THE
21ST CENTURY 19-25 (2000).
2. For a discussion of the variety of goals and purposes of U.S. foreign aid, and
changing goals, see LANCASTER, supra note 1, at 9-28.
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be better laws and better lawyers. And that simple idea grew. By the
end of the twentieth century, aid no longer focused exclusively on the
basics for human existence but grew to include much more complex
forms of assistance, including rule of law development aid.4 This type of
aid brought foreign lawyers and law professors to nations around the
world to help rewrite constitutions, draft new laws, train lawyers, train
judges, and build new courthouses and infrastructure for the legal
systems of developing countries. But should rule of law development
assistance be part of the overall aid package given to every country? Is it
as basic a type of assistance as vaccination programs or road building
projects? Alternatively, should this type of aid wait until the country is
at a certain level of development?
The United States is one of the major donors and direct assistance
providers for rule of law development and has spent billions of dollars
and deployed thousands of lawyers to help build rule of law in countries
around the world.6 The U.S. approach to rule of law development is not
unique and is shared by European countries and intergovernmental
organizations, including the European Union, the United Nations (U.N.),
and the World Bank.7 However, this article will focus on the United
States because it is uniquely positioned, as a world power, to change the
approach to rule of law development around the world.8 This type of aid
increased dramatically in the 1990s when the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia dissolved.9 This article will critically examine how the
3. See, e.g., David M. Trubeck & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment
in Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (describing the development of law and development theories,
including current approaches).
4. See generally What We Do, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do (last
visited Feb. 9, 2013) (listing eight broad categories of aid through USAID: agriculture,
democracy & governance, economic growth, the environment, education, health, global
partnerships, and humanitarian assistance).
5. See discussion infra Part II. For a discussion of the specific rule of law
development work in Afghanistan, see infra Part III.A.
6. See, e.g., RACHEL KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: NEXT
GENERATION REFORM 5 (2012). For information regarding the difficulty of calculating
how much is spent for rule of law development, see infra notes 12, 24, 94 and
accompanying text.
7. See Order in the Jungle: The Rule of Law Has Become the Big Idea in
Economics. But It Has Its Difficulties, ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 2008, available at
http://econ.st/e68jmr (providing an example of how pervasive the rule of law rhetoric has
become in economic development circles).
8. As the example of Afghanistan illustrates, the United States often spends
considerably more money, and with that money, carries more influence regarding the
direction of aid programming. See discussion infra Part III.A.
9. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE
40-53 (1999) [hereinafter AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD] (providing an overview of the
[Vol. 117:3
20131 THE FLAWED U.S. APPROACH TO RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT 801
United States approaches this form of aid using the example of the
decade-long rule of law development effort in Afghanistan.
The key flaw to the United States' approach is routinely including
rule of law development assistance as a part of the overall development
effort without regard to whether the recipient country is at a
developmental stage where it is able to absorb some or all of this type of
aid. This model is based on two assumptions: that rule of law
development assistance will help build or improve rule of law; and that
rule of law development assistance will not harm the development of rule
of law. This model is applied to countries regardless of the difference in
conditions. This means that rule of law development assistance is part of
the development package to countries with relatively high levels of
economic development, and to those with relatively low levels of
economic development; to countries that are politically stable and
peaceful, and to those that are in the midst of armed conflict.1l One of
the changes in rule of law development assistance over the last two
decades has been the recognition that aid should be particular to the
circumstances in the country at the time."' Yet, this recognition has not
led to asking the threshold question of whether it is appropriate to
provide this type of aid given the particular circumstances in the country
at the time. It is time to ask whether it makes sense to bring in foreign
lawyers to work with the local legal system, to train lawyers and judges,
to rewrite laws, and to provide the full range of assistance that is rule of
law development assistance. There may be countries that need other
types of aid more urgently, such as building roads, improving healthcare,
improving education, and improving access to clean water.
To understand what is wrong generally with the U.S. approach to
rule of law development, it is helpful to understand the assistance efforts
increase in democratization assistance, including rule of law assistance, during the
1990s).
10. One question is whether rule of law assistance efforts should be approached
differently in a country in conflict (not post or pre-conflict). Scholars have concluded
that rule of law assistance efforts in post-conflict countries require approaches and
analysis specific to the post-conflict environment. See, e.g., PER BERGLING, RULE OF
LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
REFORM IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITION AND DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATION (2006) [hereinafter BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL
AGENDA]; JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF
LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS (2006); Robert J. Muscat, Lessons from Post-
Conflict Aid Experience, in BEYOND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN: LESSONS FROM
DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE (John D. Montgomery & Dennis A. Rondinelli eds., 2004).
Thus far, scholars have not analyzed how to approach rule of law assistance in a country
currently in conflict. The serious security situation in Afghanistan calls into question it
being referred to as a "post conflict" country. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
11. See discussion infra Part lI.D.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:3
in Afghanistan, as it is in many fundamental ways a typical example of
the U.S. approach to rule of law development. Over the last decade, the
United States has spent approximately $18.8 billion in Afghanistan,
making it the single largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance.
12
Despite a decade of assistance, Afghanistan remains a fragile and
conflict-affected country. The security situation in Afghanistan has
worsened in recent years,13 basic infrastructure remains poor, and the
average Afghan citizen still lives in poverty. 14  Despite education
assistance, illiteracy rates remain high. 15 Most Afghans still suffer from
lack of access to clean drinking water, basic health care, and good
nutrition. 16 Afghanistan is a highly complex country for any type of
development assistance, but particularly for rule of law development
assistance. 7 In addition to the complex internal environment, there is the
added complexity of the many countries and intergovernmental
organizations, including the United States, actively providing aid to
Afghanistan. 18 Despite these conditions, the rule of law development
12. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 112TH CONG., EVALUATING U.S.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN (Comm. Print. 2011), available at
http://on.cfr.org/YJAFbF [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM. REPORT]. This
funding, however, is just part of total U.S. government funding going to Afghanistan and
does not include funding from sources such as the U.S. State Department or the U.S.
military. By one calculation, the U.S. government spent $22.8 billion on all U.S.
government assistance in the country. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. FOR U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE & THE BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS, REPORT OF INSPECTION: RULE-OF-LAW
PROGRAMS IN AFGHANISTAN 4 (2008), available at http://1.usa.gov/YZj43v [hereinafter
INSPECTION REPORT]. However, it is difficult to calculate how much the Defense
Department is spending on specific aid categories, such as rule of law related programs.
Id. at 5.
13. See, e.g., Security in Afghanistan, INT'L CRISIS GRP., http://bit.ly/WyLHC5 (last
updated Aug. 23, 2011) ("Security has deteriorated across the country, with the highest
civilian casualty rates since 2001, and the insurgency is spreading to areas previously
considered relatively safe, including the provinces around the capital Kabul."). The
Koran burning events are a recent example of the insecurity in the country. See Graham
Bowley & Alissa J. Rubin, 2 U.S. Officers Slain; Advisers to Exit Kabul Ministries, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2012), http://nyti.ms/WTxHCx.
14. Afghanistan's Human Development Index is "one of the worst in the world."
CTR. FOR POL'Y & HUM. DEV., AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007:
BRIDGING MODERNITY AND TRADITION: RULE OF LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 19
(2007), available at http://bit.ly/irVDiu [hereinafter AFG. HUM. DEV. REPORT].
15. See id. (estimating that the adult illiteracy rate is over 75%).
16. See id. at 19-20, 22-23. "As many as 68% of the population lack sustainable
access to clean water, and 50% of Afghan children under five are underweight." Id. at
19-20.
17. See generally AMIN SAIKAL, MODERN AFGHANISTAN: A HISTORY OF STRUGGLE
AND SURVIVAL (2006) (providing a more comprehensive history of Afghanistan);
Afghanistan Conflict History, INT'L CRISIS GRP., http://bit.ly/14HD5La (last updated Jan.
2010) (providing a shorter summary).
18. Donor nations pledged $360 million specifically for rule of law development at
the Rome Conference in July 2007. See Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law in
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effort in Afghanistan has mirrored the basic model, or "standard menu,"
used in a variety of other countries.' 9 The effort has included legislative
drafting; assistance to build courthouses and other aspects of the legal
system's infrastructure; assistance to improve legal education; and
training programs for lawyers, judges, and legal educators. 2° After a
decade, it is time to consider the value and impact of these efforts and
attempt to draw lessons to guide future development efforts in both
Afghanistan and other fragile and conflict-affected countries. This
article intends to start that critical process.
Part II explains the basic U.S. approach to rule of law development
assistance, including the assumptions that rule of law development
assistance will build rule of law and that it will not harm it. Part III
examines the rule of law assistance efforts in Afghanistan over the last
decade, including the increased emphasis on providing assistance to the
informal justice sector. Part IV explores the challenges in Afghanistan
that have impeded rule of law development and considers whether these
challenges are such that the overall rule of law development effort in
Afghanistan has harmed the development of rule of law. Part V reports
the results of a small-scale original survey of rule of law assistance
providers in Afghanistan. The respondents to this survey were uniformly
critical of the rule of law development work in Afghanistan and raised
concerns that support the need to question continuing "business as usual"
in other fragile and conflict-affected countries.
Finally, Part VI of this article suggests that the experience in
Afghanistan demonstrates the need to change how the United States
approaches rule of law development. Part VI also challenges the model
that rule of law development should be an integral part of every
Afghanistan, Rome, It., July 2-3, 2007, Chairs Conclusions, available at
http:/Ibit.ly/WHvlYn [hereinafter Rome Conference Conclusions]. However, critics
point out that money pledged is not money dispersed. See, e.g., MATr WALDMAN,
OXFAM INT'L, FALLING SHORT: AID EFFECTIVENESS IN AFGHANISTAN 2 (2008), available
at http://bit.ly/lluyEFQ. To date, donors and the government of Afghanistan have
concluded four documents providing the framework for rule of law and assistance efforts
in Afghanistan: (1) Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the
Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. SCOR,
4434th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Bonn Agreement],
available at http://bit.ly/rTuLGw; (2) LONDON CONF. ON AFG., JAN. 31 - FEB. 1, 2006,
THE AFGHANISTAN COMPACT (2006), available at http://bit.ly/14HDddK; MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, JUSTICE FOR ALL: A
COMPREHENSIVE NEEDS ANALYSIS FOR JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN (2005), available at
http://bit.ly/WyPBLk [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL]; and (4) Rome Conference
Conclusions, supra.
19. This "standard menu" includes reforming institutions, rewriting laws, upgrading
the legal profession, and increasing legal access and advocacy. See CAROTHERS, AIDING
DEMOCRACY ABROAD, supra note 9, at 168.
20. See id.; see also infra Part III.A.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
assistance effort regardless of the circumstances in that particular country
at the particular time. This article recommends that the United States
change its rule of law assistance approach and that, in the future, it
should not routinely include rule of law development assistance into all
developmental aid packages. The United States should consider whether
a particular country is ready for rule of law development assistance by
analyzing the current conditions in the country-including the level of
economic, political, and social development-and whether the country is
currently in armed conflict. Depending on the level of development, it
might make better sense for limited rule of law assistance, or to provide
no rule of law assistance and instead to focus on other development goals
and advocate for rule of law development at a political level.
II. RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
A. Background
Rule of law2' development assistance is a relatively new type of
development assistance. Traditionally, development assistance focused
on economic aid and clearly defined projects, such as building bridges,
building roads, digging wells, and providing vaccinations, health care,
and education.22 Rule of law development assistance began during the
"law and development movement" as early as the 1950s and expanded in
the 1960s and 1970s.23 Practitioners in this earlier era saw legal
21. This article will not define rule of law; instead, it will focus on the type of
development work that falls under this broad category. For brief rule of law definitions,
and for an explanation on the difference between a "thick" and "thin" approach to rule of
law, see the following: MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW
REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS 12-37 (2008);
BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 10, at 14-19;
Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006) [hereinafter
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD] (criticizing how the rule of law development
field defines rule of law and the negative impact this has on rule of law development
assistance efforts).
22. See, e.g., supra note 1.
23. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law
and Development, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 209, 216-17 (2011) (stating that the law and
development movement was seen as a failure by many of those who participated in it);
Francis G. Snyder, The Failure of 'Law and Development,' 1982 Wis. L. REV. 373, 381-
83 (reviewing JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980)). But see Bryant F. Garth, Rethinking the
Processes and Criteria for Success, in COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR A JUST AND EQUITABLE SOCIETY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 11 (Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck ed., 2001) (arguing that categorizing the law
and development movement as a failure is incorrect and reflects a short-term view of
results). If looked at over a longer period (20 years), the seeds that were planted during
[Vol. 117:3
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development as a necessary part of overall economic development. The
current era of rule of law development assistance began in the 1990s, as
former communist nations transitioned to new forms of government and
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia dissolved into many newly independent
24nations.
In the 1990s, rule of law promotion enthusiasts started to support or
propose rule of law development programs for a larger variety of reasons
including to improve economic development; 25 to improve human rights
protections; 26 to reduce poverty;27 to develop or strengthen democracy;
28
to bring better safety and security to post-conflict countries;29 and to
promote peace-building and/or conflict-prevention. 30  Rule of law
promotion rose to new heights and, as Thomas Carothers observed, "One
cannot get through a foreign policy debate these days without someone
proposing the rule of law as the solution to the world's troubles.'
the law and development movement rooted and are part of the change in some Latin
American countries, notably Brazil. See id at 13.
24. See, e.g., Tamanaha, supra note 23. As discussed in this article, using the
example of Afghanistan, rule of law development aid can be provided in so many
different ways that it can be difficult to find comprehensive statistics regarding how
much money donors spend in this area. See supra note 12 and infra note 94. One
estimate gives a total of $127.9 million in 2006 for "legal and judicial development." See
JAN PERLIN & MICHELLE INDIA BAIRD, OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, TOWARDS A NEW
CONSENSUS ON JUSTICE REFORM: MAPPING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTOR 30 (Nov.
2008), available at http://osf.to/V26aAg ("It is clear, in any case, that aid in this category
has been growing. It may therefore be concluded that this area of development has
become established, despite remaining questions concerning how best to implement it
and what it should entail.").
25. For a more critical and recent view of whether law promotes development, see
Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and
Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 937 (2008).
26. See Lelia Mooney et al., Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: A Conversation on
its Evolution, Setbacks, and Future Challenges, 44 INT'L LAW 837, 842-43 (2010);
Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What's the Relationship?, 36 GEO.
J. INT'L L. 809, 840 (2005).
27. See, e.g., Mooney et al., supra note 26 at 843.
28. USAID considers rule of law to be part of democratization work and
organizationally places it in that category. See, e.g., Democracy, Human Rights and
Governance, USAID, http://l.usa.gov/lluyXQZ (last updated Feb. 1, 2013). One
question raised is whether democracy or rule of law should be aided together or whether
rule of law is a necessary precursor to democracy. See Thomas Carothers, How
Democracies Emerge: The 'Sequencing' Fallacy, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 12, 12-14 (2007),
available at http://bit.ly/12yKJsS (arguing against taking a sequential approach); see also
discussion infra Part VI.B.
29. See generally STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 10 (describing how rule of law
assistance can be improved after future military interventions in post-conflict
reconstruction).
30. PERLIN & BAIRD, supra note 24, at 17 (discussing the rationales for criminal
justice development aid).
31. Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD, supra note 21, at 31.
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Many rule of law development programs do not have a singular goal but
32
use many, if not all, of the above reasons. The specific assistance
provided to an individual country varies to some degree depending on
the circumstances in the country and, more importantly, on the type and
degree of political engagement that the donor nation or organization has
with the recipient country.
33
Rule of law development assistance is among the most complex
form of foreign aid. It involves every sector of a society, including the
economy, judiciary, education system, legal professionals, and the
general public. 34 Rule of law requires a high level of buy-in from the
local population and a certain level of development for absorption of
technical aid.35 Rule of law development assistance programs, therefore,
usually engage on multiple levels throughout a society, ranging from
highly technical programs for court administration and legislative reform
to training for legal professionals to programs aimed at changing the
attitudes of the general public.36
The standard approach to rule of law development tends to overlook
the reality that rule of law promotion is done on two levels: a political
level and a developmental level.37  The analysis of rule of law
development work often assumes that political-level work is a part of the
process as it is rare that development work is not complemented at the
32. Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD, supra note 21, at 15, 17-18.
33. See generally Larry Diamond, Foreign Aid in the National Interest: The
Importance of Democracy and Governance, in FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY:
LESSONS FOR THE NEXT HALF-CENTURY 61 (Louis A. Picard et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter
FOREIGN POL'Y LESSONS]; Steven W. Hook, Foreign Aid in Comparative Perspective:
Regime Dynamics and Donor Interests, in FOREIGN POL'Y LESSONS, supra, at 86.
34. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 21 (describing different parts of
rule of law development and the challenges with making progress in these areas).
35. For a discussion on developing local ownership and why this might matter in
rule of law development projects, see BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL
AGENDA, supra note 10, at 64-69.
36. See, e.g., CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD, supra note 9, at 157-206.
37. For a critical analysis of the failure to look beyond the aid component of rule of
law work, see generally Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad:
Three Problems of Scope, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 51 (2009):
With only rare and minor exceptions, the existing, North American dominated
rule of law literature, implicitly equates rule of law aid (financial and technical
assistance) with the totality of external factors involved rule of law promotion.
In reality, however, aid represents only one component-arguably a relatively
minor one-in a broader spectrum of intervention mechanisms available to
international actors, actually and potentially.
Id. at52.
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political level. 38 Diplomats and politicians perform political-level work.
One example is when the U.S. President expresses public concern about
the human rights situation in a particular country to the leader of that
country.39 Another example is when senior diplomats or international
organizations express concern about particular topics or events.40
Development professionals routinely acknowledge that rule of law
development, or any development, requires a certain amount of "political
will.' 4  However, it is less common to see analysis of rule of law
promotion work on a purely political level, without the developmental
component.42 This was not always the case. The Helsinki Accords are
an example, from a previous era, of political-level rule of law promotion,
without a developmental component, that had a stated focus on human
rights protections for countries that were signatories.43  As will be
discussed, in some countries it makes better sense to limit rule of law
promotion to the political level and not to engage at a developmental
level.44
B. Governance or Assistance?
Donors give development assistance under two basic models. The
first is a model of intervention where the international community45 takes
control of the country, including its government and legal system. 46 This
38. Reflecting this proposition is the fact that "the terms 'rule of law aid' ... and
'rule of law promotion' are largely treated as synonymous and used interchangeably." Id.
at 98.
39. Id atllo.
40. Id. at 109-10.
41. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 33, at 69-75; BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE
INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 10, at 64-69.
42. See Magen, supra note 37, at 98 (advocating that rule of law promotion can
happen on multiple levels, beyond development aid, and that both academics and rule of
law development professionals should recognize these multiple levels, including the
political level work described in this article).
43. The Helsinki Accords included three commitment "baskets": security, economic
cooperation, and human rights. See Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 28 I.L.M. 527. Thirty-five nations signed the Helsinki
Accords, including the United States and the Soviet Union. See Signing of the Helsinki
FinalAct, ORG. FOR SEC. AND CO-OPERATION IN EUR., http://bit.ly/14XWY1Q (last visited
Feb. 10, 2013).
44. See infra Part VI.B.
45. The term "international community" is regularly used to refer to the variety of
international donors and assistance providers at work in a particular country. In
Afghanistan, this term refers to "the U.S. and its Western allies, [as they are] the
dominant players in Afghanistan." INT'L CRISIS GRP., AFGHANISTAN: THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE, at i (2008), available at http://bit.ly/XrKque [hereinafter NEED
FOR INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE].
46. For a basic overview of this approach, see CALN TRENKOV-WERMUTH, UNITED
NATIONS JUSTICE: LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN GOVERNANCE OPERATIONS (2010).
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model is often referred to as "governance operations" or as part of
"peace-building operations." Under this model, representatives of the
international community ultimately control legislative drafting and
reform.47 Also, under this model, international personnel often play
direct roles within the domestic legal system, acting as judges and
lawyers in courts within the country.48 Although this model has been
widely used in countries such as Kosovo, East Timor, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, it is not the focus of this article as the questions are
necessarily different once the international community has decided to
govern a nation. In that situation, the threshold question of whether to
provide rule of law assistance necessarily shifts to the question of how to
govern and how the laws and legal system should operate when outsiders
control it.
This article instead focuses on questions regarding the second
model under which rule of law development assistance is provided.
Under this model, the recipient country maintains sovereignty while
accepting international donor assistance.49 In Afghanistan, this model
was labeled the "light footprint" approach. ° Under this model,
international personnel working in the country may act as advisors in the
legislative drafting process, or observe court proceedings, but they do not
have the power to pass or approve legislation, or play any direct role in
the legal system.5
C. The Two Assumptions
Rule of law development assistance is premised on two
assumptions: that rule of law development assistance will help build or
improve rule of law; and that rule of law development assistance will not
harm the development of rule of law. As will be discussed in this Part,
and later in the context of Afghanistan, policy-makers and rule of law
assistance providers should accept neither assumption.
47. See id. at 164-69 (describing the process in Kosovo); see also id. at 159-64
(describing a different process in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
48. For one account of life as a U.S. prosecutor working in Kosovo for the U.N., see
PHILIP KEARNEY, UNDER THE BLUE FLAG: MY MISSION IN Kosovo (2008).
49. Thomas Carothers described this form of assistance in CAROTHERS, AIDING
DEMOCRACY ABROAD, supra note 9, at 157-206.
50. For a critical view of this approach, see Francesc Vendrell, The International
Community's Failures in Afghanistan, in THE RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: MISSING IN
INACTION 53, 53-60 (Whit Mason ed., 2011).
51. Although, in practice, their influence can be substantial even without the
authority to unilaterally make change. See, e.g., discussion infra Part III.A (regarding the
U.S. influence in Afghanistan).
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1. Rule of Law Development Assistance Will Help Build or
Improve Rule of Law
Although rule of law development assistance has existed for over 50
years, this form of aid is still not well understood, in part because there
are relatively few empirical studies.52  Rule of law practitioners plan
projects and programs based on general understandings of what they
think makes sense due to their experiences in other countries, rather than
relying on guidelines or well-researched studies suggesting how to
approach this type of development work.53 Rule of law practitioners
often understand that building the rule of law is long-term work that
depends on many elements.54 They assume that rule of law development
programs will contribute to that development.
55
Critics suggest that part of the problem may be that rule of law
development is discussed as a stand-alone field. In a recent article, Brian
Z. Tamanaha cautions that considering law and development to be a
distinct field "is a conceptual mistake that perpetuates confusion.
5 6
According to Tamanaha, there is a lack of any "uniquely unifying basis"
on which to "construct a 'field"' 57 In his critique, Tamanaha discusses
the wide variety of factors involved in influencing law and the
development of legal systems, in what he terms the "Connectedness of
52. See generally STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 10; Thomas Carothers, The
Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD, supra note 21, at 15
[hereinafter Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge]; Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law
Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD, supra note 21, at 161; BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES
TO THE RULE OF LAW (Erick G. Jensen & Thomas Heller eds., 2003). For an overview of
the criticism of current rule of law efforts and scholarship, including the need for better
empirical work, see Magen, supra note 37.
53. See generally Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law and "The Three Integrations," 1
HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 21 (2009); Randy Peerenboom, The Fiture of Rule of Law:
Challenges and Prospects for the Field, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 5 (2009); Veronica L.
Taylor, Frequently Asked Questions About Rule of Law Assistance (and Why Better
Answers Matter), 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 46 (2009).
54. For a brief history of the various areas that law and development scholars have
focused on, including an analysis of how culture has been considered a key element in
building the rule of law, see Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and
Development, 57 BUFF. L. REv. 511, 517-38 (2009); see also Wade Channell, Lessons
Not Learned About Legal Reform, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD, supra note
21,at 141-43.
55. For an earlier analysis of this assumption, see Cynthia Alkon, The Cookie Cutter
Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under post-Communist Democratization Programs,
2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 327, 342-45 [hereinafter Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome].
56. Tamanaha, supra note 23, at 220 ("Law and development work is more aptly
described as an agglomeration of projects advanced by motivated actors and supported by
external funding.").
57. Id. at 220.
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Law Principle. 58 Under this principle, everything in a particular country
ranging from its culture, political and economic system, level of
industrialization, language, religion, ethnic composition, and level of
education affect the development of law to such a degree that outsiders
may have only limited or minimal influence. 59 Tamanaha suggests that
the better approach is to recognize that every society with "at least, a
minimally functioning legal system" enjoys legal development, and
foreign assistance is largely irrelevant in this process. 60  Rule of law
assistance providers and donors engaged in this field do so with the
opposite assumptions: that rule of law development is a field and that
this type of aid will develop rule of law.
61
2. Rule of Law Development Programs Will Do No Harm
Rule of law development programs are also based on the
assumption that, because rule of law is so important, it is always better to
do something. At worst, these programs will have limited
achievements.62 This assumption may not be true. A poorly designed
rule of law development program could do harm by either delaying or
preventing progress towards rule of law. I have previously expressed the
concern that promoting alternative dispute resolution processes in
countries with endemic corruption could reinforce distrust in the formal
legal system and may delay the development or improvement of rule of
law.63 As will be discussed in Part IV, there are serious concerns that
assistance to the informal justice sector in Afghanistan may cause harm
both to individual human rights and to the attitudes of the average
Afghan citizen towards the formal legal system, which may ultimately
delay or impede the development of rule of law.64
D. Changing Rule of Law Development Assistance
Rule of law assistance has historically taken a "top down" approach,
focusing on a country's formal justice institutions, its judges, lawyers,
58. Id. at214.
59. Id. at 214-16.
60. Id. at 241.
61. See Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome, supra note 55, at 342-45 (analyzing
some of the underlying assumptions).
62. See, e.g., KLEINFELD, supra note 6, at 59-78.
63. See generally Cynthia Alkon, Lost in Translation: Can Exporting ADR Harm
Rule of Law Development?, 2011 J. DisP. RESOL. 165 [hereinafter Alkon, Lost in
Translation].
64. See infra Part IV.A.
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prosecutors, and legislation. 65 There has been less focus on grassroots-
level work.66 Recently, aid providers have shown increased interest in
informal or customary dispute resolution processes as part of an overall
rule of law development effort, particularly in countries with far less
established legal systems.67  This newer focus area seems to follow
donors thinking that they should start the aid process by analyzing the
current state of legal development and by working with what currently
exists. What exists is legal pluralism, or a society "in which multiple
legal forms coexist. ''68 In the context of many countries receiving rule of
law development assistance, having multiple legal forms means there
might be a formal judicial system-with courts and procedures that
resemble those found in countries around the world-alongside informal
forms of dispute resolution, such as village tribunals, that operate based
on custom and tradition instead of formal laws. 69  Rule of law
development increasingly involves aid to these informal or traditional
structures as part of the overall rule of law development assistance
program, particularly in countries where the formal legal system is far
less developed.7° Yet, as will be discussed in the context of Afghanistan,
there is no clear evidence that this approach helps the development of
rule of law and, more importantly, there is serious concern that this type
of assistance could cause harm.71
Despite the similar approaches and "standard menu" of rule of law
development activities, rule of law assistance providers frequently refer
to the need to individualize assistance programs to ensure they are
appropriate for the specific country.72 The scholarship in this area also
65. See generally Golub, supra note 52 (questioning the assumptions in the "top
down" approach to rule of law development). For another view of "bottom-up" legal
development, with examples from Nepal, see Cohen, supra note 54, at 517-38.
66. See generally Golub, supra note 52.
67. See JANINE UBINK, INT'L DEV. LAW ORG., RESEARCH AND POLICY NOTE:
CUSTOMARY JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM 2-5 (2011), available at: http://bit.ly/YfiqgS. See
generally Julio Faundez, Legal Pluralism and International Development Agencies: State
Building or Legal Reform?, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 18 (2011) (discussing development
agencies giving more attention and aid to "Non-State Justice Systems").
68. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in Development, 3
HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 1, 2 (2011).
69. Id. at 6-9.
70. See generally Faundez, supra note 67, at 18 (cautioning that donors will "not
achieve meaningful progress" aiding formal and informal structures unless they "are
willing to take a wider and political approach"). One goal of these programs is to
develop better "linkages" with the formal justice sector. See, e.g., UBINK, supra note 67,
at 7-12.
71. See discussion infra Parts I.A, IV.A.
72. See generally USAID, GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS: THE RULE
OF LAW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, A GUIDE FOR USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
OFFICERS (rev. ed. 2010), available at http://1.usa.gov/TU5Q5c [hereinafter USAID,
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consistently recommends more individualization in developing assistance
programs. 73 There are now a number of assessment tools to assist donor
nations and organizations to individualize their aid packages so that they
are specific to the needs and level of development for each country.74
However, despite the improved resources and changes in rhetoric, the
approach to providing rule of law development assistance still looks very
similar in each country.75 Furthermore, none of the existing assessment
tools measure whether it is appropriate to provide rule of law
development assistance in the first place. This focus is because such
tools are intended for use after policy-makers have already decided to
provide assistance, when practitioners are faced with the question of
what to do with the expected funds. Thus, although there is increased
rhetoric about individualizing assistance programs, there remains a
failure to analyze the individual circumstances in each country to
determine if it is appropriate to give rule of law development assistance
as part of the overall aid package.
III. RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT WORK IN AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan is a mountainous, landlocked country that is close in
76size to the U.S. state of Texas, with an approximate population of 32
million.77 Only around 13 percent, or 3.5 million people, live in the
GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS]; UNITED NATIONS, GUIDANCE NOTE OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL: UN APPROACH TO RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE 1-2 (2008), available
at http://bit.ly/XZjOyl [hereinafter GUIDANCE NOTE].
73. See, e.g., Tamanaha supra note 23, at 219 ("Law and development practitioners
and scholars recognize this fundamental truth. 'Context matters,' 'local conditions are
crucial,' 'circumstances on the ground shape how things work'-this insight has been
repeated so often it is nearly a clichd.").
74. See e.g., USAID, GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 72, at
27-41 (discussing various assessment factors to understand the particular situation of the
country). The American Bar Association, through the Central and East European Law
Initiative and later the Rule of Law Initiative, created a number of assessment tools
including the Judicial Reform Index, the Prosecutorial Reform Index, the Legal
Profession Reform Index, and the Legal Education Reform Index. See Rule of Law
Initiative Publications, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://bit.ly/UK3ozQ (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
75. See Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD, supra note 21, at 7-8. See generally BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE
INTERNATIONAL AGENDA supra note 10 (providing a more comprehensive study of
current practices and approaches). For an earlier critique of the similarities in approach,
see Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome, supra note 55, at 327.
76. The World Fact Book-Area Comparative, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
http://l.usa.gov/jgrwMs (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
77. See Afghanistan Profile, BBC, http://bbc.in/Ry80rQ (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
In July 2012, the CIA estimated the population at 30.4 million, after "significantly
revising the figure" from over 33 million based on Soviet census numbers. See The
World Fact Book-Afghanistan, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, http://l.usa.gov/1 5B6Vg
(last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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capital of Kabul. 78 Afghanistan is a poor nation that has a conflict-
plagued history and poor overall levels of development. Afghanistan,
therefore, presents a highly complex environment for all development
work, but particularly for rule of law development because it is the most
complex form of development assistance.79  Current international
assistance to Afghanistan began in 2001, after the U.S. led NATO
invasion following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United
States.8° International donors have focused rule of law development
efforts in two broad areas: substantive assistance and donor
coordination. 81 The substantive assistance efforts included assistance to
write laws, build courts, and educate lawyers, judges, and law students.
82
These efforts have been in the criminal justice sector and in civil and
commercial law areas. Donor coordination was a part of the effort
almost from the beginning of the assistance efforts in 2001 due to the
large and varied group of donors.
A. Substantive Rule of Law Development Assistance in Afghanistan
There is no single definition of what qualifies as rule of law reform
work in Afghanistan.83 The lead nation approach, discussed below,
separated justice sector reform from police, corrections, and counter-
narcotics reform.84 Clearly, under a broad definition, assistance to all of
these sectors could qualify as rule of law development assistance. To
focus the discussion, this article will limit the analysis to rule of law
development work with legal professionals, dispute resolution processes,
and the formal justice system. The article excludes police and
78. The World Fact Book-Afghanistan, supra note 77.
79. For earlier accounts of the challenges facing the international community in rule
of law development in Afghanistan, see generally LAUREL MILLER & ROBERT PERITO,
U.S. INST. OF PEACE, ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN (2004); J.
Alexander Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan (Ctr. on Democracy,
Dev. & Rule of Law, Stanford Inst. for Int'l Studies, Working Paper No. 9, 2004),
available at http://stanford.io/lMjlTC; AFG. HUM. DEV. REPORT, supra note 14, at 53-66
("Establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan entails resolving multiple problems. .. key
challenges [are] personal insecurity, past human rights violations, injustice towards
women and children, the growing narcotics trade, institutionalized corruption, and land
disputes .... ).
80. For a brief description of the overall aid effort in the period following the "U.S.-
led Intervention," see INT'L CRISIS GRP., AID AND CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN 6-7 (2011),
available at http://bit.ly/nrJ2vl.
81. Astri Suhrke & Kaja Borchgrevink, Negotiating Justice Sector Reform in
Afghanistan, 51 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE, 211, 213-14 (2009).
82. See discussion infra Part III.A.
83. See, e.g., INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 12, at 7 (focusing on work in
Afghanistan and stating "[t]here is no single universal definition of Rule of Law").
84. See, e.g., NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE, supra note 45, at 5.
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corrections work. Although the rule of law assistance effort in
Afghanistan focused on the "standard menu" adopted in numerous other
countries, rule of law providers also recognized that the starting point in
Afghanistan was different from what they encountered in other
countries.85 In 2003, the U.N. Development Project reported that:
The physical infrastructure of [the justice] institutions has been
destroyed during the past decades of war and political upheaval and
requires rehabilitation. In addition, and more critically, the country's
legal "software"--the laws, legal decision, legal studies, and the texts
of jurisprudence-are largely lost or scattered across the world.
86
Italy, as the lead nation in justice sector reform, initially focused its
projects in three areas: legislation, infrastructure, and training and
capacity building.87 Italy's decision on focus areas was not the result of
a comprehensive assessment of the situation throughout Afghanistan.88
This is not unique, as the international community routinely engages in
rule of law assistance work without investing time to monitor and assess
the current situation to plan appropriate programs.8 9 Unfortunately, the
international community continues to fail to engage in systematic or
85. For a description of the standard menu, see CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY
ABROAD, supra note 9, at 168.
86. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, REBUILDING THE JUSTICE SECTOR OF AFGHANISTAN IA
(2003), reprinted in SETH JONES ET AL., ESTABLISHING LAW AND ORDER AFTER CONFLICT
77 (2005). By another account, "Afghanistan had been more comprehensively destroyed
after twenty-two years of continuous war than any country since World War II apart from
Vietnam." AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAILURE
OF NATION BUILDING IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA 171 (2008).
87. See MATTEO TONDINI, STATEBUILDING AND JUSTICE REFORM: POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN 48 (2010).
88. Id. (describing the focus of Italian projects as legislative reform, training and
capacity building, and rehabilitation of infrastructure with no description of any
assessment or process to choose these focus areas).
89. The U.N. recognized that this process is a continuing problem in conflict and
post-conflict countries and, in 2011, released the U.N. Rule of Law Indicators, which are
aimed at assessing the criminal justice sector in a given country. DEP'T OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS & OFFICE OF HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM. RTs., RULE OF LAW INDICATORS:
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE AND PROJECT TOOLS (2011), available at http://bit.ly/TU9Wul.
The failure to assess the overall situation in Afghanistan was also not unique to rule of
law development providers. When the NATO invasion began, Ahmed Rashid noted:
Governments, UN agencies, multinational lending institutions, universities, and
NGOs were preparing concept papers on how to start reconstructing
Afghanistan, but nobody had a clue about the country. None of the agencies
had the capacity or the contacts to be able to consult Afghans about their basic
needs or development priorities. Since 1978 no comprehensive census had
been taken and no economic data gathered. Most of the plans were
"guesstimates."
RASHID, supra note 86, at 171.
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comprehensive assessments or monitoring of the justice system in
Afghanistan.9"
Despite the designation of Italy as the lead nation in this area of
reform, academics and rule of law workers on the ground observed that
the United States was the de facto leader in all donor fields from the
beginning of the assistance efforts. 91 By March 2008, scholar Matteo
Tondini calculated that the United States was funding 71 percent of all
justice sector projects in Afghanistan.92 The result, according to Tondini,
is that the United States' influence in this area is "hundreds of times
more than other donors.,
93
The United States provides rule of law assistance through four
primary agencies: the U.S. State Department through the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL); the
Department of Justice (DoJ); the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID); and the Department of Defense (DoD).94 The
primary implementers of these programs are short-term direct hires or
contract staff.95 Through these agencies, the U.S. government funds and
organizes rule of law programs that range from prison building, 96 to
public legal education campaigns,97 to the training of judges, lawyers,
90. INT'L CRISIS GRP., REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY 3 (2010),
available at http://bit.ly/WVBtbk.
91. See, e.g., TONDINI, supra note 87, at 62 ("[T]he projects carried out by




94. See id. at 82; see also EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES., KABUL, AFGHANISTAN,
http://kabul.usembassy.gov/offices2.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (listing the U.S.
agencies working in Afghanistan); USAID Afghanistan, USAID, http://l.usa.gov/aI3411
(last visited Feb. 10, 2013). However, it is difficult to determine how much money, in
total, the United States has spent in this area. See, e.g., INSPECTION REPORT, supra note
12, at 23. Funding for the ROL (rule of law) program in Afghanistan is split among
several U.S. government agencies. There is no one place where all funds spent
specifically on ROL can be identified. ROL program funding is often multi-year and is
combined with other programs such as police training and correction facilities, which
makes identification of specific costs difficult. The U.N., other bilateral donors, and a
variety of NGOs also fund ROL programs. The result is that there is currently no way to
readily identify ROL funding and subsequently to identify duplicate programs,
overlapping programs, or programs conflicting with each other. See id. at 24, 43-44
(providing an overview, by agency, of funding and types of projects).
95. INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 12, at 4.
96. See DEP'T OF STATE, http://l.usa.gov/YJFhyB (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
97. See Afghanistan Rule of Law Project, USAID, http://l.usa.gov/m5enIH (last
visited Feb. 10, 2013) [hereinafter ARoLP]; see also INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 12,
at 18 (describing public outreach work including the translation and distribution of laws
and production of radio and television programs, billboards, pamphlets "in comic book
format," to explain rights under the new constitution and protecting those rights under the
judicial system).
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and prosecutors.98 Between 2004 and 2007, the United States also built
40 courthouses throughout Afghanistan.99 All of these projects have
been in addition to those conducted by other donors and assistance
providers, which have often overlapped with other projects and
programs. °°
Drafting laws has been a mainstay in rule of law assistance
programming in Afghanistan. One of the first tasks was to draft a new
constitution and, in 2004, the new Afghan Constitution was signed and
promulgated pursuant to provisions in the Bonn Agreement.10' The
Bonn Agreement was the first in a series of agreements laying forth the
basic foundations for the Afghan state after the NATO invasion and
established that Afghanistan would remain fully sovereign. 10 2  In
addition, as has been the pattern in other countries, the international
community assisted in writing and encouraged the passage of a full range
of new laws.'0 3 As will be discussed, international involvement in the
legislative drafting process has been heavily criticized.' 4  Yet the
passage of each new law provided an opportunity to conduct training.
For example, the lead training organization in the early years of the
assistance effort in Afghanistan was the primarily Italian-funded
International Development Law Organization (IDLO), which conducted
training in 2004 on the new Criminal Procedure Code for judges,
lawyers, and police officers. 1
05
98. See, e.g., ARoLP, supra note 97; Rule of Law Stabilization Program Formal
Component, USAD, http://l.usa.gov/VLdZKW (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
99. See TONDINI, supra note 87, at 83. These courthouses were built despite serious
questions about having judges and lawyers available to staff them. See discussion infra
Part IV.A.
100. See TONDINI, supra note 87, at 83.
101. See id. at 49-51; BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA,
supra note 10, at 172-173. For a critical analysis of the constitutional drafting process,
see REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 7-9. The 2004
Afghan Constitution reflects the conflicts between the role of secular and Islamic law and
has been described as a "pick and choose process where everyone got something" that
"virtually guaranteed continuation and expansion of the Afghan Conflict." See id. at 13.
Unlike some of the legislative drafting processes described in this article, the
constitutional drafting process included substantial Afghan involvement. See, e.g.,
TONDINI, supra note 87, at 49-51.
102. For more information on the Bonn Agreement, see infra notes 127-129 and
accompanying text.
103. See Michael E. Hartmann & Agnieszka Klonowiecka-Milart, Lost in
Translation: Legal Transplants Without Consensus-Based Adaptation, in THE RULE OF
LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: MISSING IN INACTION, supra note 50, at 266 (offering a critical
analysis of this process).
104. See discussion infra IV.A.
105. See TONDINI, supra note 87, at 57. However, training has been criticized when
non-Afghans lead the approach. See Michael E. Hartmann & Agnieszka Klonowiecka-
Milart, Lost in Translation: Legal Transplants Without Consensus-Based Adaptation, in
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The International Community also encouraged and assisted in the
development of specialized courts, high commissions, and investigative
bodies. 10 6  One example is the Criminal Justice Task Force that
investigates and prosecutes serious drug cases.10 7  Afghanistan is the
largest producer of opium in the world. 0 8 Beginning in 2005, the U.S.
State Department invested $383 million in rule of law and justice
institution development as part of its counter-narcotics efforts. 0 9 The
drug cases prosecuted through this structure are not only highly complex
but also highly dangerous for prosecutors and judges."10 Nevertheless,
some have questioned whether these specialty courts are effective, while
also criticizing them for "adding unnecessary complexity to the system"
ofjustice."'
Another type of rule of law assistance given in Afghanistan has
been the placing of experts within particular institutions to act as on-site
advisors." 2 Under this type of assistance, a foreign expert with years of
experience in a particular field-for example, a prosecutor-is placed in
the appropriate governmental office to provide daily advice and
assistance. It is hoped that this type of assistance will help build capacity
both with particular individuals who interact with the foreign expert and
on a broader institutional level.' '3
THE RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: MISSING IN INACTION, supra note 50, at 266, 278
(statement of Att'y Gen., Abdul Jabar Sabit) ("I will not have my prosecutors taught their
criminal procedure and penal codes by lawyers from Australia and Argentina who fly in
for six weeks and then fly out!"). However, aware of this concern, some organizations
focused on bringing experts from other Muslim countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia.
The International Development Law Organization (IDLO), for example, used numerous
experts from Egypt. IDLO considered Egypt a relevant source of expertise as some of
the laws in Afghanistan, such as the Civil Code, were modeled on Egyptian laws.
Telephone Interview with Geralyn Busnardo, former Dir. of the Int'l Dev. Law Org.
Office in Afg. (June 12, 2011) [hereinafter Busnardo Interview].
106. REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 3.
107. Id. at 18-19.
108. See, e.g., Illicit Drugs, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORLD FACTBOOK,
http://l.usa.gov/b5yRrs (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
109. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFGHANISTAN DRUG CONTROL: STRATEGY
EVOLVING AND PROGRESS REPORTED, BUT INTERIM PERFORMANCE TARGETS AND
EVALUATION OF JUSTICE REFORM EFFORTS NEEDED (Mar. 2010), available at
http://I.usa.gov/a7mRLt.
110. See REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 19.
111. See id.
112. Suhrke & Borchgrevink, supra note 81, at 211, 213.
113. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Exporting Knowledge through
Technical Assistance and Capacity Building, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 233 (2010)
(examining the impact of long term advisors in anti-trust technical assistance efforts and
describing that this type of assistance works best if the ministry has relatively more
power within the country's economic and political system and that it worked better when
established with bilateral, rather than multi-lateral, donors).
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One broad category of assistance that does not fall into the
"standard menu" has been assistance provided for informal dispute
resolution processes.'14 The Bonn Agreement and subsequent documents
recognized this area due to the fact that traditional or customary dispute
resolution processes are still very much a part of Afghan society. 11 5 As
will be discussed in Part IV, the average Afghan citizen is far more likely
to use informal dispute resolution processes, and the international
community has recognized that fact through a number of projects
focused on informal dispute resolution processes or customary law.1 6
The United States is a primary assistance provider for what it terms
"community based dispute resolution processes.""' This assistance has
included: supporting Afghan non-governmental organizations working
in this field; training village elders on Afghan and Sharia law and human
rights; conducting public outreach about dispute resolution topics; and
establishing working groups of elders and actors from the formal justice
system to improve coordination between the two sectors." 8 The United
States increased its investment in these types of projects and recently
earmarked $25 million for assistance to the informal justice sector in
Afghanistan. 119
What all of these projects have in common is high costs for
international personnel. Each project or program is organized around the
international staff and consultants who administer the programs and act
as expert advisors or trainers. Due to factors such as the poor security
situation, 120 the costs are considerably higher than in other countries and
reportedly range from $250,000 to $1 million per year for each
114. See discussions infra Part W.A. Although assistance to customary/traditional
justice programs is becoming more frequent. Id.
115. See BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 10, at
146. For a listing of the relevant documents, see supra note 18.
116. See, e.g., USAID, AFGHANISTAN RULE OF LAW STABILIZATION PROGRAM
(INFORMAL COMPONENT) ASSESSMENT: FINAL REPORT (2011), available at
http://l.usa.gov/W3yQWI [hereinafter USAID FINAL REPORT] (describing USAID's rule
of law development work in Afghanistan's informal justice systems).
117. Id. at 19.
118. See id.
119. REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 31. At least
$10 million will be spent on a formal study of the informal justice sector in the country.
Id. There are serious questions about whether this is an appropriate area for rule of law
development assistance. See discussion infra Part W.A.
120. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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international staff member.121 By one estimate, these costs consume 25
percent of all aid to Afghanistan.
122
B. Donor Coordination
Rule of law development workers almost immediately faced a
chaotic situation due to the large and diverse group of international
actors involved in providing assistance in Afghanistan. In total, 39
countries were in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 
123
An even larger number gave assistance on some level with, for example,
a total of 60 countries and institutions pledged to give assistance during
the London Conference in 2006.124 The international organizations that
are actively engaged in Afghanistan include the U.N., the European
Union, and NATO. 125  In addition, the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, and numerous non-governmental organizations are
also actively engaged in the country. In December 2001, just weeks after
NATO forces successfully ousted the Taliban from central control of the
country, 126 Afghan delegates, without Taliban representatives, approved
the Bonn Agreement that established the framework for Afghanistan's
initial legal and political future. 27  Under the Bonn Agreement,
Afghanistan would remain a sovereign nation with interim local
leadership. 128 The agreement included provisions for a relatively quick
121. See FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM. REPORT, supra note 12, at 22. These costs
include salary, benefits, extra pay for dangerous conditions, security arrangements, and
living quarters. Id.
122. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 87, at 98. Others
place the number even higher. See, e.g., WALDMAN, supra note 18, at 3.
123. See BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 10, at
145. The U.N. Security Council authorized the establishment of the ISAF "to help the
Interim Administration maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas." Id.
124. NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE, supra note 45, at 7; see also infra notes
142-144 and accompanying text.
125. See id.
126. But see TONDINI, supra note 87, at 17:
[T]he Taliban was never completely driven from the country and have
continued to have an influence on both politics and the on-going conflict. By
one estimate 'at the beginning of 2008, the Karzai Government controlled just
under one-third of the country (30-31%). The remaining part was split between
the Taliban (10-11%) and local tribes (58-60%)."'). In 2007, one estimate
reported that 54% of the country "hosted a permanent Taliban presence.
127. See Bonn Agreement, supra note 18; see also BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE
INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 10, at 144-45 (2006).
128. See generally Bonn Agreement, supra note 18. After some delays, the first
Presidential elections were held in October 2004. See Afghanistan's Presidential
Election, CBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2004), http://bit.ly/YZo2xd.
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electoral process. 129  Afghanistan's full sovereignty meant that the
structure for rule of law assistance in the country was different from that
of countries such as Kosovo and East Timor where the U.N. actively
controlled the judiciary, police, prison systems, and promulgation of
laws. 130 In contrast, in Afghanistan, the U.N. adopted a "light footprint"
approach and did not assume authority to pass laws or control the
administration of the state. 13 1 Many observers saw the "light footprint"
approach adopted in Afghanistan to be the result of "lessons learned"
from previous U.N. governance operations in places like the Balkans.13
A primary stated goal of the "light footprint" approach was to have
"local ownership" of the assistance process. 133 The lead nation approach
was intended to aid in this effort and to help coordinate the large number
of international players. 134 Italy was designated the lead nation in justice
sector reform. 135  However, the lead nation approach did not prevent
129. Bonn Agreement, supra note 18 Many are critical of the push for elections,
particularly in politically unstable and volatile environments. See generally PAUL
COLLIER, WARS, GUNS, AND VOTES 8, 20-21 (2009) (arguing that building a "fagade"
through elections "is likely to frustrate democratic accountability, rather than fast-track
it," and concluding democracy was "more dangerous" in low-income countries"); AMY
CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC
HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003) (examining the connection between democracy
in developing nations and worsening ethnic conflict).
130. See MILLER & PERITO, supra note 79 at 4. For a more detailed explanation of the
U.N. Mission in Kosovo and Administration in East Timor, see TRENKOV-WERMUTH,
supra note 46, at 50-150.
131. See discussion regarding the Criminal Procedure Code, infra Part IV.A.
Although in practice the international community wielded considerable power and has
been criticized for putting pressure on Afghan authorities to, for example, promulgate
laws that were substantially written by outsiders without any meaningful Afghan input.
132. See MILLER & PERITO, supra note 79, at 4-5 ("[A] light UN footprint would force
donor nations to accept their responsibility for assisting Afghanistan, rather than putting
responsibility on the UN and then underfunding the mission and blaming it for the
resulting failure."); see also BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA,
supra note 10, at 142-43. For a view that the international community "may sooner or
later revert to a model of international governance" and away from the "light footprint"
approach, see TRENKOV-WERMUTH, supra note 46, at 9.
133. TONDINI, supra note 87, at 20. However, the model in Afghanistan has been
characterized as more of a "mixed ownership regime." Id. at 87-90; see BERGLING, RULE
OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 10, at 142. One concern is that the
lead nation approach weakens a "sense of national accountability and ownership,"
thereby working against the original goal. Id. For a discussion on some of the reasons
"local ownership" was difficult, see AID AND CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN, supra note 80,
at 8-13.
134. See generally Emma Sky, Afghanistan Case Study: The Lead Nation Approach,
in CRISIS STATES RESEARCH CENTRE, LOCAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM:
A GUIDE FOR DONORS 59-66 (Laurie Nathan ed., 2007), available at
http://bit.ly/XWhRVJ; NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE, supra note 45, at 10.
135. See TONDINI, supra note 87, at 47; see also BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE
INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 10, at 146; NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE,
supra note 45, at 5. The United States was the lead nation to assist the armed forces;
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complaints about a lack of donor coordination from assistance providers,
observers, and scholars. 136 Critics have also stated that the lead nation
approach is to blame for the lack of a coherent policy for rule of law
assistance providers.' 37
As part of the Bonn process, Consultative Groups were formed to
improve coordination and to put "local ownership" into the aid
process. 3 8  The Justice Sector Consultative Group began work in
January 2003 with the aim of coordinating all work in the justice
sector. 139 It was chaired by the Afghan Ministry of Justice, with Italy
acting as "focal point."'140  This Consultative Group was further
subdivided into ad hoc working groups on particular topics. 14' By
January 2006, at the London Conference on Afghanistan, delegates
signed the Afghanistan Compact and introduced the Interim Afghanistan
National Development Strategy, which included four rule of law
benchmarks.142 As part of this process, the Afghan government wrote a
Germany was the lead nation to assist the police; Japan was the lead nation for
disarmament; and the United Kingdom was designated the lead nation for counter-
narcotics. Id.
136. See, e.g., TONDINI, supra note 87, at 58-60 (describing coordination problems
between international aid organizations and within and between Afghan institutions);
NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE, supra note 45, at 10 (describing the variety of
nations and organizations involved and the impact of coordination problems on overall
development and security goals).
137. BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 10, at 146.
However, aid providers regularly complain about the lack of coordination, which is often
the result of the lack of structure in how aid is provided with bilateral assistance efforts
often working towards very different goals than multi-lateral efforts, or other bilateral
assistance. Id. For a more nuanced view of coordinating donor efforts in postwar
environments, see Roland Paris, Understanding the "Coordination Problem" in Postwar
Statebuilding, in THE DILEMMAS OF STATEBUILDING: CONFRONTING THE CONTRADICTIONS
OF POSTWAR PEACE OPERATIONS 53 (Roland Paris & Timothy D. Sisk eds., 2009).
138. See TONDINI, supra note 87, at 46-47, 91.
139. Id. at 46-47.
140. Id. at 47.
141. Id.
142. The benchmarks, all to be accomplished by the end of 2010, were:
(1) To establish the civil, commercial, and criminal legal framework
required by the constitution and distribute it to the public and
judicial and legislative institutions;
(2) Justice institution should be fully operational in each province of
Afghanistan, and the average time to resolve contract disputes
should be "reduced as much as possible";
(3) Conduct a review and reform the due process, miscarriage of
justice, and corruption oversight procedures by the end of 2006
and "fully implemented.., by end-20 10"; and
(4) Rehabilitate the justice infrastructure and have separate prison
facilities for women and juveniles.
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG., AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: AN
INTERIM STRATEGY FOR SECURITY, GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC GROWTH & POVERTY
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ten-year plan, "Justice for All,,' 143 and a five-year national development
plan, the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (i-
ANDS).144
Following the London Conference, the Consultative Groups were
reorganized to bring them in line with the Afghan government's new
organizational vision. 145  The Governance, Rule of Law, and Human
Rights Consultative Group initially had 75 members and divided into
eight working groups, one of which was the Rule of Law Working
Group. 146 This Working Group was further divided into sub-working
groups.147 Each group included Afghan and international members.
148
The July 2007 Rome Conference on the Rule of Law reaffirmed the
international community's commitment and the participants
demonstrated this commitment with pledges to contribute more to the
rule of law sector.149 The Rome Conference led to further changes in
donor coordination, including the problematic process of adopting a
National Justice Sector Strategy, which was to be implemented by a
National Justice Program. 150  Donors also agreed to establish the
Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism to better coordinate central
and provincial justice sector assistance.'15
REDUCTION 222-23 (2005), available at http://bit.ly/lluBZop [hereinafter AFG. NAT'L
DEV. STRATEGY]. Arguably, other benchmarks in the Compact are also rule of law
benchmarks, but the Afghan government specifically designated the list above as rule of
law benchmarks.
143. See JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 18 (discussing the ten-year plan).
144. AFG. NAT'L DEV. STRATEGY, supra note 142, at 25 (discussing the five-year
plan). For descriptions of the plan, see Suhrke & Borchgrevink, supra note 81, at 219;
TONDINI, supra note 87, at 65-66.
145. TONDINI, supra note 87, at 66.
146. Id. at 66.
147. Id. The sub-groups included: Law Reform (further divided into a criminal and
civil law committee); Infrastructure; Justice Institutions and Judicial Reform (divided into
committees to reform the judiciary, Attorney General's Office, and the Ministry of
Justice); Legal Education and Training (divided into committees on Legal Higher
Education, Professional Training, Establishment of the National Legal Training Center);
Access to Justice and Legal Aid; Corrections (divided into committees on Reconstruction
and Rehabilitation of Prisons, Training, Administrative Reforms, Establishment of a
Maximum Security Facility at Pul-e-Charkhi Prison); and Women and Children in
Justice. Id.
148. Id. at 66.
149. The total pledged was $360 million. See Rome Conference Conclusions, supra
note 18. Others have stated that the total amount was $98 million, including $15 million
from the United States, $30 million from Canada, and $13.6 million from Italy.
INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 12, at 5; see Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of
Law in Afghanistan, Rome, It., July 2-3, 2007, Joint Recommendations, available at
http://bit.ly/W3zDqL [hereinafter Joint Recommendations].
150. ToNDnwI, supra note 87, at 70-77.
151. See Joint Recommendations, supra note 149; TONDINI, supra note 87, at 71.
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The larger aid providers also had to confront issues of internal
coordination. 52 For example, the United States not only has multiple
agencies and departments charged with providing rule of law assistance
but also a variety of grantees and contractors. 153 Coordination between
these various players broke down and, "by late 2005, internal U.S.
coordination meetings on [rule of law] were best characterized as
shouting matches between representatives of different agencies."'1 54 By
early 2006, the U.S. Embassy created a U.S. Mission Rule of Law
Coordinator to address these problems. 155 However, as with so many
organizational structures put in place in Afghanistan, the position seemed
in constant flux. The position shifted from a Department of Justice
position to a U.S. State Department Foreign Service Officer position to
the Ambassador rank position of Coordinating Director of Rule of Law
and Law Enforcement. 156
On a practical level, the variety of organizational and coordination
structures and the regular changes in those structures has had a direct
impact on the day-to-day work of assistance providers since the
beginning of the assistance efforts in Afghanistan. Due to the
organizational and coordination structures, international aid providers
spend no small amount of their time attending meetings, exchanging e-
mails, and writing reports, plans, and strategies in an effort to understand
what others are doing and to avoid duplication.157
IV. CHALLENGES FOR RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN
AFGHANISTAN
The challenges impeding rule of law development in Afghanistan
are the types of challenges that are common in other fragile and conflict-
affected nations. Therefore, as part of the process of drawing lessons
from Afghanistan for future rule of law assistance efforts, it is important
to consider what these challenges are and whether they support or refute
the two main assumptions that rule of law development work will build
rule of law and that rule of law development work will not harm the
152. See, e.g., INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.




156. The position is currently held by Ambassador Hans Klemm, former U.S.
Ambassador to East Timor, who is a career foreign service officer with no significant
experience in rule of law development or law enforcement and who is not a lawyer. See
Coordinating Director of Rule of Law and Law Enforcement, EMBASSY OF THE U.S.,
KABUL, AFG., http://1.usa.gov/14YOucy (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
157. One concern is that these meetings are often used to collect information, not to
share it. Busnardo Interview, supra note 105.
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development of rule of law. In Afghanistan, there are four fundamental
areas that pose challenges for rule of law development assistance: (1) the
level of legal development; (2) the poor overall level of economic and
social development; (3) the level of institutional/political development;
and (4) ongoing armed conflict.
A. The Level of Legal Development
Historically, Afghanistan's formal legal system was poorly
developed and rarely reached beyond urban areas.158 There are three
often-competing forms of law in Afghanistan: secular statutory law,
Islamic Sharia law, and customary tribal law.'59
Traditionally, the sources of law in Afghanistan were customary
tribal law and Islamic law. 160  Legal reforms in the 1960s and 1970s
added secular statutory law into the mix with the adoption of substantive
and procedural codes. 61 However, because these codes were not easily
accessible, even judges and prosecutors that worked during those eras
did not have a solid understanding of the codes. 162 The Taliban did not
recognize statutory or secular law and dismantled many of the formal
legal structures. 163 This left most Afghans with the choice of bringing
their disputes to an informal or customary tribal dispute resolution
process or doing nothing to resolve them.164
Therefore, at the time of the NATO invasion, Afghanistan almost
entirely lacked a formal legal system. Matteo Tondini concludes that the
low level of legal development in 2001 meant that the "international
community was not required to restore the justice system in place, but to
build it up for the first time."'' 65  The existing legal system had been
158. Ali Wardak, Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan, 41 CRIME, L. &
Soc. CHANGE 319, 326 (2004).
159. See REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 13-18
(discussing how these competing laws create challenges).
160. For a description of Shari'a law and customary law in Afghanistan, see Susanne
Schmeidl, Engaging Traditional Justice Mechanisms in Afghanistan: State-building
Opportunity or Dangerous Liaison?, in THE RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: MISSING IN
INACTION, supra note 50, at 152-57.
161. See TONDINI, supra note 87, at 94; see also Suhrke & Borchgrevink, supra note
81, at 215-17; REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 1-6.
162. See TONDINI, supra note 87, at 94.
163. See REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 6-7,
Suhrke & Borchgrevink, supra note 81, at 218.
164. See supra note 163.
165. TONDINI, supra note 87, at 94.
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reduced to Islamic and tribal courts. 16 6 Afghanistan had few courthouses
and, perhaps more importantly, few trained legal personnel. 
167
No reliable figures exist for the numbers of judges, prosecutors, and
lawyers in the period just before the NATO invasion. By early 2006,
there were reportedly 1,500 judges nationwide. 168 However, there was
no standard requirement for education levels of judges. According to
Afghan Supreme Court statistics gathered in 2005, education levels
varied from below a 12th grade education to a university degree in law
and political science. 169  There were also few trained lawyers in the
country. In 2007, 236 lawyers were registered with the Ministry of
Justice. 170 After the passage of a new law creating an independent bar
association, the number of registered lawyers increased to 600.171 In
addition, by 2007, there were approximately 2,500 prosecutors
nationwide.
172
Additionally, there were few formal laws from the Taliban period,
and no complete and available copy of the applicable laws in the country
existed. 173 The immediate question for the international community, if
not for the average Afghan citizen, was what laws to recognize because
no set of easily accessible laws existed.174 During the Bonn Agreement's
interim period, the laws in force were the 1964 Afghan Constitution and
the compilation of laws and regulations passed since 1964, unless such
laws contradicted the Constitution or the Bonn Agreement. 175 However,
some codes, such as the 1974 Criminal Procedure Code, were not
adopted in this interim period. 176 Instead, a former Italian Magistrate,
Hon. Dr. Guiseppe di Gennaro, drafted an interim Criminal Procedure
Code that was in force pending the adoption of a new code by the
166. See, e.g., MILLER & PERITO, supra note 79, at 7-10; TONDINI, supra note 87, at
25.
167. See supra note 166.
168. TONDINI, supra note 87, at 63.
169. Out of a total of 1050 judges, only 100 had a university degree, while 500 judges
had Sharia law degrees; 200 had between a 12th and 14th grade education, while 250 had
below a 12th grade education. TONDINI, supra note 87, at 63. The basic law degree in
Afghanistan is at the university, not graduate, level. See, e.g., Political Science and Law,
AM. UNIV. OF AFG., http://bit.ly/XZm74J (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (describing Bachelor
of Law degree that will be offered beginning in Spring 2013).




174. One of the early tasks for the International Development Law Organization was
to physically collect all the existing laws to "put an end to the situation of legal anarchy."
Id. at 54.
175. Id. at 27.
176. Hartmann & Klonowiecka-Milart, supra note 103.
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Afghan parliament. 177 Both Afghans and international observers heavily
criticized this Criminal Procedure Code because of the perception that
Judge Gennaro did not consult with Afghans during the drafting phase
and because of the concern that the new code did not reflect a sufficient
understanding of the conditions in Afghanistan. 17
8
Overall, the legislative drafting program has been heavily
criticized. 179 Some have criticized the approach because the international
community has tended to not consult or work closely with Afghan
counterparts, but instead has often written or rewritten laws with no
"formalized, transparent consultative[,] and consensus building
process.'180 Although rule of law workers, observers, and scholars have
raised serious questions about the legislative drafting process itself,
fewer questions have been raised about the underlying need for the
international aid community to be heavily engaged in this process.
181
Corruption is endemic and reportedly worsening. 182 Corruption is
often blamed as the primary reason that Afghans regularly bypass the
formal justice system and instead resolve their disputes through
customary law and informal dispute resolution processes.'8 3 Corruption
is a problem throughout Afghanistan, not just in the justice sector.
l8 4
However, prosecutors, police, and judges are all reportedly susceptible to
pay-offs in exchange for dropping cases, and the low pay of all of these
177. TONDINI, supra note 87, at 27; Hartmann & Klonowiecka-Milart, supra note
103, at 275-76.
178. Suhrke & Borchgrevink, supra note 81, at 213-14; REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S
BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 10-11; Hartmann & Klonowiecka-Milart, supra
note 103, at 276-82 (questioning why the 1974 criminal procedure code was not adopted
and whether there was a need for a new criminal procedure code at all).
179. See Hartmann & Klonowiecka-Milart, supra note 103, at 275; see also infra Part
V.
180. Hartmann & Ktonowiecka-Milart, supra note 103, at 275.
181. For example, only a few of the survey respondents raised this concern, which
reflects the overall environment in which this work is done. See infra Part V.
182. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Dexter Filkins, State's Secrets Day 5:
Pervasive Afghan Graft, Starting at the Top, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at Al. See
generally USAID, ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN (2009), available at
http://usat.ly/XrP4bH.
183. THOMAS BARFIELD ET AL., U.S. INST. OF PEACE, THE CLASH OF Two GOODS:
STATE AND NON-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 21 (n.d.), available at
http://bit.ly/127maPa. For a more detailed description of the formal legal institutions and
customary practices, see Wardak, supra note 158; see also The Justice Sector in
Helmand: A Way Forward, a report of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Lashkar
Gah and Task Force Helmand (Aug. 2007) (on file with author). "The only system that
effectively counts is the informal, customary system. No amount of extra funding or
assistance is going to change that." Id. at 1.
184. See, e.g., Dexter Filkins, Loss of Faith in Afghan Leaders May Hurt Push
Against Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010; Jean MacKenzie, Corruption in Afghanistan:
The Elephant in the Room, GLOBAL POST (Apr. 15, 2011), http://bit.ly/WVCBvD.
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professional groups combined with the availability of relatively large
amounts of cash from illegal drugs undoubtedly helps fuel the problem in
the justice sector.185  Anti-corruption rhetoric often categorizes
corruption as the problem leading to other problems, instead of viewing
corruption as simply an indicator of existing problems. Reflecting this
thinking, the Afghan Attorney General reportedly said, "Corruption is
the mother of all crimes in Afghanistan.
'' 86
However, corruption in Afghanistan may instead be an example of
unintended consequences or indicate areas where the society is not able
to absorb change. For example, the expansion of the formal justice
sector has reportedly led to an increase in abuses such as arbitrary
detention, in part because judges and prosecutors do not understand or
misinterpret the law 187 and in part due to corruption. 188 Because the
international community has focused aid on the formal justice system,
there are now more police officers and detention facilities. 189 These new
''resources" have at times been misused; people have been detained or
imprisoned so that pay-offs will be made to judges, prosecutors, police
officers, and the complaining victim to get charges dismissed or cases
thrown out.' 90 There have been increasing calls for additional focus on
the informal justice sector.' 9' As stated above, from the early days, the
international community and the Afghan government recognized the
primacy of the informal justice sector. 192 However, in the early years of
the assistance effort, there was little attention or assistance given to aid
the informal justice sector. 193  As the years have gone by, and as
frustration has grown with the lack of progress in developing the formal
justice sector, many in the aid community are revisiting this decision and
185. REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 26. As one
indication of this problem's magnitude, in 2009, 12 prosecutors in the Anti-Corruption
Unit of the Attorney General's Office took a polygraph test asking whether they had
taken a bribe or worked with insurgent groups in the last two years. Id. The results were
that "90 per cent probably had been involved in graft schemes or were linked to
insurgents." Id.
186. INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 12, at 20.
187. REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90 at 28.
188. Id. at 22.
189. See id; INT'L CRISIS GRP., POLICING IN AFGHANISTAN: STILL SEARCHING FOR A
STRATEGY 2 (2008), available at http://bit.ly/XrPej6.
190. REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 25-29.
191. See generally LIANA SUN WYLER & KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41484, AFGHANISTAN: U.S. RULE OF LAW AND JUSTICE SECTOR ASSISTANCE 1, 41
(2010), available at http://bit.ly/hpsDQV.
192. See generally supra notes 115-116.
193. USAID FINAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 13 (discussing current work in this
area, including earlier work by the U.S. Institute of Peace).
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advocating for more assistance to the informal justice sector.
194
Advocates for this type of assistance recommend it as a way to aid or
complement counter-insurgency work in the hope thataid to the informal
justice sector will help build better links to the formal justice sector to
strengthen it.' 95 However, customary justice is criticized due to the
treatment of women and other less powerful people within these
traditional and informal processes. 196  Both national and international
laws are routinely violated in the informal justice sector.197 Critics also
contend that the goal of linking the formal and informal justice systems
"rest[s] on faulty assumptions about the practicalities of implementation
in a political system shaken to its core by corruption and violent
insurgency."' 98  One concern is that the parts of the country where
informal justice processes are most heavily used are also areas most
affected by the insurgency so that it is difficult to monitor abuses and
compliance with the law. 199 Donors working in this area do not seem to
consider the possible impact this form of assistance might have on public
opinion and public perceptions of the formal legal system.200 There have
been few studies and little empirical work on the impact of funding and
other aid to informal justice sectors.2°' It is therefore difficult to
conclude with certainty that supporting the informal justice sector will
have any influence on building legitimacy for the formal justice sector.
Unfortunately, in the absence of any information supporting the linkage,
it seems to be wishful thinking that this type of assistance will have that
194. See INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 12, at 15-17 (recommending a closer look at
work in the informal justice sector).
195. USAID FINAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 19 (discussing reasons to support the
informal justice sector).
196. See, e.g., Rod Nordland & Alissa J. Rubin, Child Brides Escape Marriage, But
Not Lashes, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2010), http://nyti.ms/VRj8vL. The incident reported in
the article is the beating of two child brides after they escaped from their elderly
husbands and were returned to the village, tried and sentenced to 40 lashes. See id This
incident is an example of "runaway customary justice." REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S
BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 28; see also U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. &
OFFICE OF U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM. RTS., HARMFUL TRADITIONAL PRACTICES AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW ON ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Dec.
2010), available at http://bit.ly/WVCGzg.
197. REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 31.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., USAID FINAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 19.
201. See id. at 13; see also ERICA HARPER, INT'L DEV. LAW ORG., WORKING WITH
CUSTOMARY JUSTICE SYSTEMS: POST CONFLICT AND FRAGILE STATES 1, 174 (2011).
Studying customary justice projects in eight countries, Harper observed, "[W]hat is
effective is situation-specific and contingent upon a variety of factors including, among
others, social norms, the presence and strength of a rule of law culture, socio-economic
realities and national and geo-politics." Id.
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impact in Afghanistan.2 °2 Additionally, although at first glance it may
seem a good idea to work with what exists in a given country, there are
serious questions about what the typical rule of law development worker
might contribute in terms of meaningful transfer of knowledge or
assistance in contexts that are often extremely localized and require high
levels of understanding of the culture.20 3 In the context of Afghanistan,
in addition to questions about whether such aid is ultimately supporting
the development of the formal justice sector, there are serious concerns
that providing assistance to the informal justice sector contributes to an
impression that the international community is approving processes that
are abusive towards women.2°4 This impression may ultimately harm the
development of rule of law.
B. The Level of Economic and Social Development
Afghanistan is a poor nation with low socio-economic indicators in
virtually every category.20 5 Infant mortality is the highest in the world.
20 6
Illiteracy rates are high; some estimate that only 28 percent of the total
population is literate, with as few as 12 percent of women able to read.20
7
Basic infrastructure is poor in Kabul and in a handful of other cities, and
worse to non-existent in the rest of the country.20 There is no reliable
system of public transportation either within or between cities. The
202. REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at ii ("In its
desperation to find quick fix solutions, the international community, the U.S. in
particular, has begun to look to the informal justice sector as a means to an undefined
end.").
203. See UBINK, supra note 67, at 18 (cautioning about the complexity in engaging in
this area).
204. See generally Jean MacKenzie, Afghan Women Trapped in Tribal Court System,
GLOBAL POST (Mar. 7, 2012), available at http://bit.ly/AOjVIB (reporting on how women
are treated in the customary justice system, and how this treatment has not linked the
formal and informal justice systems together in a way that shows better respect for human
rights).
205. The World Fact Book-Afghanistan, supra note 77 ("Much of the population
continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and
jobs.").
206. Id. The infant mortality rate is 121.63 deaths per 1,000 live births. Id.
207. Id. Although the United States and other donors provide support for education
programs, at least some observers view this area as a lost opportunity, particularly due to
the failure to invest heavily in this area in the early years after the NATO invasion.
RASHID, supra note 86, at 183-84 (2008) ("The literacy program was the largest ever
undertaken in any Muslim country. If the Bush Administration had remained focused on
this alone, it would have served as a remarkable beacon for Muslims worldwide ... ").
208. RASHID, supra note 86, at 19 1. One problem is the growth in population and the
failure of the infrastructure to keep up. Id. For example, Kabul had 400,000 residents in
1978 and grew to an estimated 3.6 million in 2005. Id. This population growth was not
planned, and the state made no provisions to provide water or electricity to the
shantytowns around the city. See id.
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roads, where they exist, are poor.209 Electricity remains unreliable or
unavailable.210 Easy access to fresh water is still a problem for many
Afghans. 211 Afghanistan is also a highly complex cultural environment
with multiple ethnic groups, tribes, warlords, and others vying for power
both nationally and, in many instances, within particular organizations.21 2
Afghanistan is a male-governed culture that restricts, by tradition if not
by law, opportunities for women.21 3
For the rule of law assistance provider, the level of economic and
social development creates a number of problems. Rule of law depends
on a certain level of education, both for the public and the legal
community. Ideally, rule of law development programs should be
conducted nationwide, not simply in the capital and a few other major
cities. The logistical difficulties of moving around the country, in
addition to the security problems, have meant that more of the work is
focused in Kabul where only a small percentage of the overall population
lives. The poor infrastructure, combined with the mountains and
distances between towns, can create serious problems in the
administration of justice. It can take days to transport defendants from
the place of their arrest or detention to the trial, and that is assuming the
local authorities have a vehicle and personnel for the journey.214
Witnesses may or may not have access to transportation to court.2 1 5
In addition to logistical problems created by poor roads and a lack
of infrastructure, rule of law development programs suffer from the fact
that the average Afghan is more focused on daily survival and less on the
larger rule of law ideas. The reality is that the average Afghan struggles
to provide food, housing, and other necessities for themselves and their
families.21 6 In such an environment, it is a challenge to motivate the
209. See id. at 186. For a general description of how better roads would improve
Afghanistan's economy, see id. at 192-93. Road building has proven to be both difficult
and expensive, as exemplified by the process of building the Kabul-Kandahar section of
the road from Kabul to Herat. Id. at 186.
210. See The World Fact Book-Afghanistan, supra note 77.
211. See id.
212. See Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in
Afghanistan, 60 ME. L. REV. 347 (2008) (describing the complex cultural environment
and its impact on development efforts); see also Jolyon Leslie, Culture and Contest, in
TIE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN 73-80 (J. Alexander Thier ed., U.S. Inst. of Peace 2009),
available at http://bit.ly/12J9BOK (describing cultural aspects of development in the near
future in Afghanistan).
213. See Jennifer Kristen Lee, Legal Reform to Advance the Rights of Women in
Afghanistan within the Framework of Islam, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 531 (2009)
(describing the situation of women in Afghanistan and the challenge to protect their
rights through legal reform).
214. See, e.g, REFORMING AFGHANISTAN's BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 17.
215. Id.
216. See generally AFG. HuM. DEV. REPORT, supra note 14.
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average person to focus on what may seem like distant and irrelevant
concepts such as rule of law development. Most Afghans rarely interact
with the formal legal system, and the formal laws in place matter much
217
less than what the actual practices are in most parts of the country.
Rule of law development requires a certain level of "buy-in," and it
requires not just legal professionals but also the general population to
accept and follow laws.2 18 This buy-in is difficult to achieve when such a
significant part of the population focuses on basic survival.
C. The Level of Institutional/Political Development
Afghanistan has a weak central government that does not control
the entire country. The country does not have a strong central
bureaucracy or strong political institutions. 21 9  Every part of the
government suffers from a lack of adequately trained workers. The
bureaucracy is not fully functional or developed, and basic government
services are not regularly provided. One of many challenges is finding
trained personnel, a challenge that is exacerbated by the opportunities
and salaries offered by the large number of employers that are
international organizations and aid providers. 220 Tribal, ethnic, and
family loyalties tend to be the predominant factors from the top to the
bottom of state structures. There is little recognition of a modem nation-
state, much less loyalty to it.
These problems create a number of challenges for rule of law
workers. Because a strong national government is lacking, it is difficult
217. See, e.g., REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 6-7.
218. See Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargaining as Legal Transplant: A Good Idea for
Troubled Criminal Justice Systems?, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 355, 377-84
(2010) [hereinafter Alkon, Plea Bargaining as Legal Transplant] (discussing the
importance of attitudes of the general public for rule of law).
219. Afghanistan consistently ranks high on Foreign Policy's Failed State Index. See
Failed State Index, FOREIGN POL'Y, http://atfp.co/jTdaIt (last visited Feb. 12, 2013). In
2011, Afghanistan ranked as the seventh worst failed state in the world, just behind
Zimbabwe and Haiti. Id. Among the 12 factors that Foreign Policy considers in the
rankings, Afghanistan rated worst in "Security Apparatus," followed by
"Delegitimization of the State." Id.
220. RASHID, supra note 86, at 181. For example, after the NATO invasion, former
Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani complained, "Within six months of starting my job as
finance minister, my best people had been stolen by international air organizations who
could offer them forty to a hundred times the salary we could." Id. At the time, civil
servants were earning an average of USD $50 per month, compared to USD $1,000 per
month for drivers working for international organizations. Id. In an effort to combat this
problem, a fund was established to supplement public employee salaries. For a critical
report on the salary supplements, see OFFICE FOR INSPECTOR GEN. FOR AFG.
RECONSTRUCTION, ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE INCONSISTENCIES IN AND LACK OF
SAFEGUARDS OVER U.S. SALARY SUPPORT TO AFGHAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND
TECHNICAL ADVISORS (2010), available at http://bit.ly/14Ylc9t.
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to conduct programming on a national scale. Low levels of institutional
development mean that basic capacity cannot be assumed, and rule of
law development projects either have made the mistake of assuming
higher levels of capacity or have spent considerable resources
compensating for the lack of capacity.22' At least one report stated that,
by 2005, the Afghan government "could spend only 44% of the money it
received for development because it had no capacity to plan and monitor
projects. 222 The focus on local ownership of rule of law development
planning, due to the "light footprint" approach, is difficult in practice
when the local actors have limited capacity, experience, or background
for policy planning, let alone implementation. 23
D. Ongoing Armed Conflict
Armed conflict also plagues the country.224 From the Soviet
invasion in 1978, through the civil war that brought the Taliban to
power-and now under NATO troops--conflict has continued and
worsened by most accounts. 225 The ongoing insurgency creates problems
for development at all levels. 6  Due to the security situation, it is
difficult for everyone, including Afghans and international development
workers, to travel freely around the country. 227 The insurgency has
228closed governmental offices, including courthouses. The ongoing
violence and threats of violence and general concerns about security are
the reported reasons that many judges and prosecutors have moved to
229Kabul or other larger urban areas.   Unfortunately, these fears seemwell founded because judges and prosecutors have been killed,
221. See infra Part V.
222. RASHID, supra note 86, at 194.
223. TONDINI, supra note 87, at 88.
224. See, e.g., J. Alexander Thier, Introduction: Building Bridges, in THE FUTURE OF
AFGHANISTAN, supra note 212, at 2-3.
225. See Taimoor Shah, Alissa J. Rubin & Jack Healy, Turban-Hidden Bomb is
Detonated at Service for Karzai 's Brother, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011),
http://nyti.ms/VR4pGz (reporting U.N statistics that find a 15% increase in civilian
casualties from the year before); see also J. Alexander Thier, Introduction: Building
Bridges, in THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 212, at 2-3; Security in
Afghanistan, INT'L CRISIS GRP. (last updated Aug. 23, 2011), available at
http://bit.ly/WyLHC5.
226. See generally BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra
note 10, at 157 (discussing some of the possible approaches the international community
could take to improve the security situation.).
227. See infra Part V.C.6.
228. See REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 17-18.
As of July 2010, the International Crisis Group reported that "at least 69 primary district
courts" were closed due to "insurgent activity." Id.
229. See REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 24.
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kidnapped, and threatened.230  The security problems in areas outside
Kabul also contribute to the problem of "ghost personnel," which refers
to when an employee's name remains on the rolls and they continue to be
paid, but the employee does not live or work in his assigned province.
23'
In areas controlled by the Taliban, there are additional concerns
including reports that the Taliban prevents people from coming to court
or using formal court structures.232
In terms of on-going development work, the armed conflict
precludes work in the more insecure areas of the country. The security
environment also means that most international development workers
live in housing provided by their employer-surrounded by their work
colleagues with security guards-making it difficult to enjoy a "normal
233life" when they are not working. Most organizations place restrictions
on where and when international staff can leave their protected
compounds and regularly declare lock-downs requiring the staff to
remain in their protected compounds and not go to dinner, go shopping,
or even visit friends at other protected compounds.234 The restrictions
that aid workers live with limit both the work they are doing and the
information they are able to gather to help with the planning and
implementation of their projects.235 Perhaps equally important, the
severe restrictions on daily activities influence who decides to work in
Afghanistan and how long they remain.236 Given these conditions, it is
not surprising that many aid workers have no prior experience in
Afghanistan or local language skills. 237 Furthermore, some aid workers
have no legal background.238 Analysts continue to criticize the lack of
expertise and experience of many international advisors working in
230. Id.
231. Id. The existence of ghost personnel does not prevent supervisors from
collecting those employees' salaries.
232. REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 24-25.
233. See Patrick Cockburn, Kabul's New Elite Live High on Western Largess, INDEP.
(May 1, 2009), available at http://ind.pn/Xqlye. Many employers restrict when or if their
employees can go to dinner, shopping, or the gym (in the few places where such activities
are even possible). One development worker in Afghanistan commented to the author
about the living arrangements: "I now know what prison is like and why it makes people
do crazy things."
234. Busnardo Interview, supra note 105.
235. See infra Part V.C.6; see also notes 295-296 and accompanying text.
236. See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
237. See infra Part V.C.3-4; TONDNI, supra note 87, at 100-0 1. However, not having
prior experience in the country and not speaking the local language are common for rule
of law development workers and are not deficiencies unique to aid workers in
Afghanistan.
238. See REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 10.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Afghanistan, which is in part due to the difficult living conditions,
including the overall security situation.239
V. SURVEY OF RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT WORKERS IN
AFGHANISTAN
This article will now discuss the results of an independent survey of
rule of law development workers in Afghanistan. This survey was
conducted to gather more information about how those involved in direct
implementation of rule of law development projects in Afghanistan
viewed their work and the rule of law assistance effort in the country.
While descriptive accounts of donor efforts in Afghanistan exist, 240 there
is little empirical research on international rule of law promotion work in
any country, including Afghanistan.241 The research that does exist tends
to focus on particular projects or particular types of work and may be
written by those who have a stake in that particular project.242 At the
same time, many donor and implementing organizations create
239. Seeid. at 10-11.
240. For an example of a common descriptive document, see generally U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG., JUSTICE SECTOR OVERVIEW (2007) (on file with author).
This 39-page document describes ongoing assistance work in Afghanistan by listing
which organizations are working on which issues. Such documents can be invaluable in
coordination efforts, but they do not provide meaningful analysis or criticism regarding
the overall rule of law assistance effort.
241. See Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD, supra note 2 1, at 15, 25-27 (discussing how little rule of law practitioners
understand about how rule of law development actually happens and the lack of "well-
grounded knowledge" in part due to the fact that many people doing rule of law
development work are lawyers who are "not oriented toward the empirical research
necessary for organized knowledge accumulation"); see also Taylor, supra note 53, at 46,
50-51 ("Many academic colleagues, development practitioners, lawyers and policy
makers and students are troubled by the knowledge vacuum in rule of law assistance....
The lack of precision and predictability in rule of law assistance is also attributable to a
widespread lack of baseline research through which to develop 'thick' descriptions of the
target legal system before we attempt the latest rule of law intervention."). For a more
detailed analysis of the institutional framework of rule of law assistance efforts, see
Veronica L. Taylor, The Rule of Law Bazaar, in RULE OF LAW PROMOTION: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES, LOCAL APPLICATIONS 325 (Per Bergling et al. eds., 2009).
242. See, e.g., D. Brooks Smith, Promoting the Rule of Law & Respecting the
Separation of Powers: The Legitimate Role of the American Judiciary Abroad, 7 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 1 (2008) (analyzing the role of U.S. judges in rule of law reform projects)
(written by a U.S. Court of Appeals Judge who participated in such projects). For an
example from Afghanistan, see Lt. Cmdr. Vasilios Tasikas, Developing the Rule of Law
in Afghanistan: The Need for a New Strategic Paradigm, ARMY LAW. 45 (July 2007). For
an example of how empirical research can contribute to better understanding of the actual
results of rule of law development work, see Cohen et al., Truth & Consequences in Rule
of Law: Inferences, Attribution & Evaluation, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 106 (2011).
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impediments to empirical research by imposing restrictions that limit
how, or if, their employees can speak about their work.243
The survey respondents were overwhelmingly critical of current
rule of law development work in Afghanistan. Most did not even
compliment their own programs or projects. Few had any kind words for
their own governments, and criticized the governments and
intergovernmental organizations actively engaged in rule of law
development work. The responses repeated several main themes: lack
of coordination between international development workers and
organizations; lack of understanding of the history, culture, and legal
environment in Afghanistan; lack of long-term vision and planning; and
a lack of qualified, competent, or well-trained international rule of law
assistance providers.2 " While many of their reflections apply to
development work generally, the more critical comments are specific to
challenges facing rule of law development assistance in Afghanistan.
A. Survey and Sample Size
The survey posed questions divided into three broad categories: (1)
experience in Afghanistan, (2) experience before Afghanistan, and (3)
opinions about rule of law promotion work in Afghanistan.245 A number
of questions sought basic demographic information about the
respondents including age, gender, citizenship, and educational
background.246 Colleagues with experience in Afghanistan or empirical
methods reviewed the first draft of the survey. Based on their comments,
I revised and distributed the survey.247
I developed an e-mail list to distribute the survey by e-mailing
friends and former colleagues to ask if they knew of anyone who was
currently, or had previously been, engaged in rule of law work in
243. See infra Part V.B.
244. Criticisms of rule of law assistance work are not unique to Afghanistan. See
generally BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, supra note 10. For
a general critique of aid efforts in Afghanistan (not specific to rule of law), see
WALDMAN, supra note 18, at 2 ("Far too much aid has been prescriptive and driven by
donor priorities-rather than responsive to evident Afghan needs and preferences. Too
many projects are designed to deliver rapid, visible results, rather than to achieve
sustainable poverty reduction or capacity-building objectives."). For a historical
perspective on aid to Afghanistan, see Yuri V. Bossin, The Afghan Experience with
International Assistance, BEYOND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN: LESSONS FROM
DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE (John D. Montgomery & Dennis A. Rondinelli eds., 2004).
245. See infra Appendix A.
246. See infra Appendix A (questions 19-22).
247. See infra Appendix A (revised and final version). Response bias could be a
problem, and many of the potentially "loaded" or "political" questions were put in the
middle of the survey and mixed in with more neutral questions (such as questions about
experience, languages, and professional training) in hopes of reducing this problem.
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248Afghanistan. Those inquiries went out to a wide range of individuals
with a mix of nationalities; my goal was to gather as many names as
possible to reflect the variety of people working in Afghanistan. 249 The
final list compiled through these contacts included 160 names. I also
contacted the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) International
Network to Promote the Rule of Law (INPROL) and asked to post the
survey on its website.25 INPROL agreed to post the survey and assisted
in searching its database for individuals with stated experience in
Afghanistan. This list generated 85 additional names that were not on
the previous list.
251
Throughout June and July in 2008, I distributed the survey by e-
mail to 221 people252 and through posting as a Query to the INPROL
website 3 In March 2009, the survey was sent again as a follow up to
non-responding names in the original survey group. The follow up
included a cover letter from a lawyer who worked in Afghanistan and
personally knew the people on the reduced list in the hopes that a
personal connection might help encourage a response. 4
248. Respondents defined for themselves what it meant to be "engaged in rule of law
work in Afghanistan."
249. The e-mail stated, "I want to make sure that I am reaching the largest and most
inclusive group possible," and asked, "If you know of anyone who has worked, or is
working in Afghanistan doing rule of law development work (by any definition of the
term), can you please send me their name and e-mail address?" E-mail from author to
numerous solicited respondents (June 2008) (on file with author).
250. The survey is viewable to INRPOL members at the following web address:
http://www.inprol.org/node/3782. Posted on July 9, 2008, the Query stated:
I am a member of INPROL and a law professor in the United States researching
rule of law work in Afghanistan. If you have experience doing rule of law or
legal sector work in Afghanistan, I would appreciate you filling out the
attached survey. For the purposes of this survey I am defining rule of law work
very broadly.... All responses will remain anonymous. This means I will not
link your name or organization to any specific statement. I intend to publish
the results in an academic law journal.... I would like the survey to go to as
many people as possible. Therefore, if you know of others who are or have
worked in rule of law development in Afghanistan who are not members of
INPROL, please either send them this survey or send their email addresses to
me so I can forward it to them. I am happy to answer any questions you may
have about the survey. Thank you in advance for your assistance.
251. Unfortunately, no one responded to the INPROL posting or to e-mails sent to
INPROL members. This lack of response may reflect limitations regarding the
networking effect of that forum, at least at the time.
252. See infra Appendix B. Eight surveys returned to the author with "undeliverable"
or "delivery failure" notices.
253. See supra note 250.
254. E-mail from author to reduced list of solicited respondents (Mar. 9, 2009) (on
file with author).
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B. Response Rate to Survey
In total, 30 people responded to the survey, a 13.6 percent response
rate overall.255 Of those respondents, 10 people replied to the e-mail
stating why they were unable or unwilling to respond to the survey,
which made the useable response rate 9 percent. Several current or
former U.N. employees declined to respond because, as one said, "U.N.
Staff are very restricted contractually in their freedom to respond to such
requests" and to do so would require advance approval. 6 A few people
declined to respond because they were no longer working in
Afghanistan.257
Several others who received the survey initially sent back questions
about my promise of anonymity. Potential respondents perceived that
some of the questions in the survey were sensitive or political, and they
therefore wanted additional assurance that their responses would not be
258linked to them in any way. A number of respondents also wanted to
know who was funding the survey and seemed concerned that the survey
had a political agenda. I confirmed that no governmental or non-
governmental entity funded this survey. I further assured respondents
that the decision to conduct the survey was due to a personal research
interest with no greater political agenda, perspective, or goal.
Perhaps the most interesting exchange was with the U.S. Embassy
in Kabul. In an e-mail dated June 27, 2008, an employee of the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul requested "assurance" that "any responses will be
entirely confidential and not for attribution, not by name, title or
affiliation.... Are you able to provide us with that assurance? ' 259 I sent
a more detailed response, assuring respect for anonymity and
encouraging responses from U.S. government personnel to ensure that
their perspective would be included in the final survey results.26 ° On
June 29, 2008, the same employee wrote:
255. By October 2008, 26 responded; one responded in January 2009, and three
responded in March 2009.
256. E-mail from anonymous respondent to author (June 27, 2008) (on file with
author) [hereinafter June 27 e-mail].
257. These e-mails are on file with the author.
258. The vast majority of the respondents are not permanent employees of the
organizations who employ them in Afghanistan. See infra Part V.C. 1. Instead, these
respondents have short-term contracts and, presumably, want their contracts in
Afghanistan renewed or at least want to stay on good terms with their employer. It is
clear from the cautious responses that many respondents did not want to become known
as "trouble-makers" or to be identified as overly critical of the work they (and their
employers) were doing in Afghanistan.
259. See June 27 e-mail, supra note 256.
260. The complete text of the Author's e-mail response dated June 27, 2008, was:
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I heard from the US Embassy in Pakistan that you had also requested
a response from them. After consulting with the RSO [Regional
Security Office], they have elected not to respond. That prompted
me to notify our RSO. Since then, ROL [Rule of Law] and RSO and
PAS [Public Affairs Section] have met and discussed the issue, and I
have also been in touch with Embassy Pakistan [sic]. The result of
those discussions is that we have decided not to respond, and that
decision applies to all Embassy components .... I'm sorry that we
are unable to help.
261
One of the earlier e-mailed surveys went to a person who had
moved from the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan to the U.S. Embassy in
Pakistan, thus unintentionally sparking the cross-border exchange.262
Another staff member of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan sent a follow
up e-mail to me apologizing for his inability to respond to the survey,
due to the e-mail quoted above, and went on to state that "we do have a
lot of security issues that are unique to Afghanistan.', 263 This e-mail
seemed to imply that the reason for the prohibition was due to security
concerns.
264
Yes, I will not attribute any statement by name, or affiliation. When I write the
results up I anticipate I may use citizenship, and level of seniority and/or state
from a diplomatic office, or aid organization, but not directly attribute which
country the diplomatic office or aid organization is from. For example, I may
say, a senior diplomat from a western country said "False." Or a senior aid
official from a western country said: "False." Alternatively I may also say a
US Citizen with many years' experience working in Afghanistan responded
"False."
I will generally report how many responses I receive from governmental, non-
governmental and inter-governmental sources. And, how many respondents
are citizens of what countries. But, as I said, I will not list with specificity
which countries the governmental organizations are from.
I am attaching an article I wrote a few years ago based on a survey I did of
women labor arbitrators in the USA. Although the topic is very different, it
should give you a sense of the style of writing and how I will approach writing
up the responses to this survey. As with this survey I promised to those
respondents that what they said would remain anonymous.
I hope this helps. If you have further questions before responding, please let
me know.
My goal is get a large response rate to make sure that what I ultimately report is
a more accurate picture. Obviously, I think hearing the views of those of you
working in US government positions is an extraordinarily important part of this
and I would not like to see it left out.
E-mail (on file with author).
261. E-mail from anonymous respondent to author (June 29, 2008) (on file with
author) [hereinafter June 29 e-mail].
262. Due to the method of compiling the list of names and e-mail addresses, I did not
know where each person was working or their positions and was unaware that any e-
mails had reached Pakistan.
263. See June 29 e-mail, supra, note 261.
264. Id.
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Despite this prohibition, a number of current employees of the U.S.
government in Afghanistan, and people who had previously worked
directly for a U.S. government agency, elected to respond. The final
such response came a few days after "all Embassy components" were
instructed not to respond when a staff member stationed at the U.S.





The response rate for this kind of survey is small but not atypical.
Although the sample of 20 useable responses is statistically insignificant,
it is valuable both in terms of providing a glimpse into how rule of law
providers in the country view their work and in highlighting some of the
methodological challenges in conducting this type of empirical research.
The survey illustrates challenges in accessing the target respondent
group, particularly from outside the country.
In this article I report the responses from the survey without
evaluating the accuracy of the opinions or statements given by the
respondents. Some of the respondents were highly critical of specific
programs or organizations. Consistent with my promise of anonymity, I
do not name or give identifying information about specific projects,
organizations or individuals, but instead characterizes the general type of
work to which respondents refer. There were also some specific
criticisms of countries, governmental aid organizations, and
intergovernmental organizations. The country or organization is named
when the comment is generic and not tied to a particular or identifiable
project or individual.
1. Who Responded to the Survey?
Within the 20 valid responses, the average age was 51; over 65
percent of the respondents were older than 50, while 15 percent were
under 35 years old. An equal number of men and women responded to
265. E-mail from anonymous respondent to author (July 2, 2008) (on file with
author). I did comply with the U.S. Embassy in Kabul's request and did not send any
further notices or e-mails to those known to be working at the U.S. Embassy. However,
the method of compiling the list of e-mail addresses meant that I was often unaware of
where a particular individual worked because many of the e-mail addresses were not
work addresses.
266. I assigned respondents a random number to protect their anonymity. Citations
will refer to those numbers only in the form of [Survey Respondent #]. All responses are
on file with the author.
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the survey. Virtually all of the respondents were lawyers.267 Of the 20
respondents, 11 of them-or just over half-were U.S. citizens. The
remaining respondents included citizens of Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.268 The
average number of years working in Afghanistan was one year and seven
months. One respondent reported being in Afghanistan for just over four
years, the longest reported time. The shortest time was two-and-a-half
weeks.269 Just over half of the respondents completed the survey while
they were still in Afghanistan. The nine remaining respondents had been
away from Afghanistan an average of one year and five months before
completing the survey. 7
Strikingly, over one third of the respondents did not have any prior
work experience in rule of law development assistance before going to
Afghanistan. 271 Two of those respondents did have experience in other
countries doing other types of development work.272 These numbers
mean that, for 25 percent of the respondents, Afghanistan was the first
time they worked outside their home country doing any kind of
development work at all.
As a group, however, the respondents were highly experienced,
which is consistent with the age spread. On average, respondents had
worked for more than 14 years in their home countries in addition to
their international experience. Only five of the respondents had less than
five years work experience in their home countries. Of those who
reported prior experience in rule of law development, the average
cumulative experience was eight years in the field. Of that number, just
under half (46 percent) had more than five years work experience doing
rule of law development work in other countries, and over 30 percent had
worked in the field for three to five years. Only one of the respondents
with prior work experience in rule of law development had experience
limited to one country other than Afghanistan. The remaining
respondents had experience in a wide range of countries and regions
including in Central Asia (not Afghanistan), Eastern Europe, Asia, and
Africa.
267. For purposes of this survey, "lawyer" includes anyone with a degree in law, even
if they are not licensed to practice in their home country. Only one respondent reported
that they were not a lawyer and/or did not have a legal education.
268. Three of the respondents reported dual citizenship. Two nationalities are not
reported in this list for confidentiality purposes.
269. Seven of the respondents were in Afghanistan for less than one year.
270. Two months was the shortest time away from Afghanistan at the time of
completing the survey; two years and eight months was the longest time.
271. Seven respondents (35%) listed no experience in response to this question.
272. The specific countries are not named for confidentiality purposes.
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The 20 respondents were also evenly divided in terms of
management experience. Forty-five percent of the respondents described
their job as "senior management." All but one of those respondents had
rule of law development experience before beginning work in
Afghanistan. 273 Thirty-five percent (seven respondents) described their
job as a "consultant" with no direct personnel management
responsibilities. Twenty percent (four respondents) described themselves
as "mid-level management," and one wrote "entry level professional."
Most of the respondents were on temporary contracts and had not
previously worked for the organization that employed them in
Afghanistan.274  Only four respondents described themselves as
permanent employees of the organization they were working for in
Afghanistan.
The average contract term was 14 months. The shortest contract
term was two-and-a-half weeks; the longest reported contract term was
three years.275 Just over 63 percent of the respondents had extended their
contract beyond its original term. In contrast, only two respondents did
not finish their original contract term in Afghanistan.
2. Why Work in Afghanistan?
Respondents' reasons for accepting a position in Afghanistan
varied. Most respondents gave several reasons for accepting the job.
Four of the 20 respondents specifically cited the high pay as a reason that
they accepted their jobs. Six of the 20 said they went to work in
Afghanistan because it would be interesting. Several others said they
took the job because they wanted to be involved in rule of law
development in Afghanistan specifically.276 One took the job for
"adventure., 277 Another took the job out of "curiosity., 278 Several said
they wanted the experience of working in a Muslim country (indicating
that Afghanistan was their first job in a Muslim country). One took the
job "[b]ecause Alexander the Great was there in the past., 279 And one
273. The average years of experience of that group was 6.2 years, with a low of 0.5
years and a high of 13 years. The one respondent without rule of law development
experience had experience in other types of development work.
274. Of the 20 respondents, 16 were on temporary contracts; of this number, only 5
had worked for the organization before. Thus, 11 respondents had temporary contracts
with employers for which they had not previously worked.
275. Three respondents reported three years as their contract term.
276. See Survey Respondent #7, #12, #19, supra note 266.
277. Id. #1. Respondent #8 also stated, "I do like challenges and adventure."
However, this was not that respondent's stated reason for taking the position.
278. Survey Respondent #18, supra note 266.
279. Id. #6.
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took the job "[b]ecause America needs to participate in rule of law
development work in Afghanistan.',
280
3. Training in Rule of Law or about Afghanistan before
Beginning the Job
Few of the organizations paid for training before deployment to
Afghanistan. Seventy percent of respondents did not receive any training
on Afghanistan or rule of law development before beginning their jobs in
Afghanistan.281 Only 25 percent had some training, 82 but the longest
"training" period was eight days. Some of the respondents came to
Afghanistan with specific graduate level degrees focused on international
relations and/or Afghanistan. None of the respondents had specific
training in rule of law before deploying to Afghanistan, although many
had experience in rule of law development due to previous work.
4. Language Training/Skills of Respondents
Afghanistan's official languages are Dari and Pashto, although
many other languages are spoken. The language of donor development
tends to be English.283  The respondents' knowledge of the two main
local languages was poor. Only one of the 20 respondents spoke Pashtu
at a self-described "basic" level. One of the 20 respondents described
their level in Dari as "fluent., 284 One respondent reported "proficient"
Dari.285 Two respondents described their level in Dari as "basic" and
four reported that they knew a "few words" or a "few phrases" in Dari.
Eleven of the respondents-or 55 percent-said they spoke no Dari at
all. Of those who reported any level of proficiency in Dari, only two
reported studying the language before they started working in
Afghanistan (one at a "fluent" level and one at a "basic" level). None of
the respondents said that language training was part of their pre-
280. Survey Respondent #16, supra note 266.
281. Respondent #10 left this question blank and was counted as "no training."
282. One respondent identified as self-studied; the respondent is not included in the
above calculations. In fairness, many of the respondents would probably agree that they
were "self-trained" by reading or doing other work in advance of arriving in Afghanistan.
283. See The World Fact Book-Afghanistan, supra note 77 ("Afghan Persian or Dant
(official) 50%, Pashto (official) 35%, Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen)
11%, 30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashai) 4%, much bilingualism, but
Dan functions as the lingua franca.").
284. Survey Respondent #3, supra note 266. This respondent was a native speaker of
one of the regional languages closely related to Dant. Id. For a description of the close
relationship between some of the main languages in the region, see WILLIAM 0. BEEMAN,
NAT'L COUNCIL FOR EURASIAN & EAST EUROPEAN RES., PERSIAN, DARi & TAJIK IN
CENTRAL ASIA (2005), http://bit.ly/UEDjA2.
285. Survey Respondent #13, supra note 266.
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28deployment training. 86 The survey did not ask a specific question about
interpreting services in Afghanistan and only one respondent discussed
287the difficulty of finding qualified interpreters. English was the
working language in 94 percent of the offices.288 Seven respondents
reported two working languages in their offices; of these seven
respondents, four had Dari as the second language. The other working
languages in the respondents' offices were French, Italian, or German.
5. Types of projects
The respondents were similarly divided between those who worked
for governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental
organizations, and those employed at "for profit" organizations. Six of
the respondents worked in governmental jobs.289 Five of the respondents
worked in inter-governmental jobs. 290 Nine respondents described their
employer as a non-governmental organization. Of that number, six were
contractors at "for profit" private organizations. The respondents' work
included providing assistance to a variety of institutions in the legal
community including the judiciary, the prosecutors, the commerce
ministry, the mining ministry, legal education, and legal aid.
Respondents also reported work in specific subject areas such as gender
equality, criminal justice sector reform, and reform to commercial and
mining laws.
6. Local Security and Travel Restrictions
The respondents were generally grim in their assessments of the
security situation in Afghanistan. Seventy-five percent of the
respondents rated security as bad or thought it was bad and getting
worse, or simply said it was worse. Of the remaining respondents, two
said they did not know the current situation, and one said the following:
"When? It is changing month-to-month. 29' One respondent felt that the
286. Few development organizations provide regular and intensive language training
pre-deployment, particularly when they depend on short-term contractors, a category that
describes most of this survey's respondents.
287. See Survey Respondent #7, supra note 266.
288. One respondent did not have an office in Afghanistan, so this figure is calculated
using 19 total offices.
289. For this survey, "government job" means someone with a direct contract with an
individual government; for example, someone directly contracting with the Swedish
Embassy or their governmental aid organizations has a government job.
290. For this survey, an "inter-governmental job" means working directly for an inter-
governmental organization, such as the U.N. or one of the U.N. agencies.
291. Survey Respondent #5, supra note 266.
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security precautions exceeded what was necessary.292 Some of the
respondents gave details of difficult security situations they found
themselves in, including rocket attacks and riots. One commented on the
difficult security environment in a country "where there's a kidnap
industry as well as an insurgency., 293 One respondent said:
I also increasingly have a 1950s/60s Viet Nam feeling: if I'm sitting
in a room with [ten] Afghans, as likely as not [seven] of them [will]
switch allegiance at nightfall (including the [three] from the Ministry
of the Interior).
294
Another respondent said that the security situation was "[e]xtremely
dangerous" and "[o]ne of [the] two major detriments inhibiting real [rule
of law] and mission success (the other being corruption).
295
A full 75 percent of the respondents also said that the poor security
situation played a role in the planning or implementation of rule of law
development programs. Most of these respondents cited the inability to
work in many provinces outside Kabul and the fact that many of their
employers enforce travel restrictions that limit their movement both
during and outside work hours. One respondent said that the security
situation "[a]lmost totally inhibits the gaining of the knowledge required
to overcome the ignorance [of rule of law development providers,] which
in turn provides a good excuse to apply the cookie cutter solutions of
seminars and 'trainings.' ' 296 Moreover, one respondent explained how
the security environment impacts hiring and retaining qualified staff as
fewer "people are willing to go and work there, especially senior people,
and the ones who do... stay for shorter periods.,
297
Despite these stated security concerns, 65 percent of the
respondents said that their organizations were working outside Kabul,
typically in Jalalabad and Herat.298 However, many of these same
respondents reported increasing difficulty in working outside Kabul, and
some gave specific examples of places they could no longer work due to
security concerns.





297. Survey Respondent #2, supra note 266.
298. Of respondents' organizations, eight worked in Jalalabad, seven in Herat, six in
Mazar-e-Sharif, and five in Kunduz.
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7. Respondent Evaluations of the Impact of Rule of Law
Development Work within Five Years and over Ten Years
Most of the respondents were not very optimistic about either the
short- or mid-term impact of their work. Half the respondents stated that
the impact within five or ten years would be "nothing" or "very little."
Three of the respondents did not answer the question. Many of the
respondents who gave more optimistic assessments gave answers that
were contingent on the security situation improving or follow-up on the
projects. For example, one respondent stated, "It will be a question of
whether there is consistent follow-on work: with the proper follow-on
work, it might be substantial; on the other hand, about 50% of the people
I trained in [another country] shot each other.,
299
Some of the respondents had a specific view of the future of their
projects, listing which projects would exist in five or ten years. One
respondent anticipated there would be legal aid offices in all provinces
within ten years.300 Another predicted that within five years there would
be a reorganized Attorney General's Office, a new Criminal Procedure
Code, and "a dedicated [a]nti-corruption prosecution unit, fully vetted
trained, equipped, experienced and successful!, 30 1 That same respondent
expected that, in ten years and beyond, there would be "[a]nti-corruption
so successful that the Afghan people can begin to trust their government.
[This success will result in a] complete, transparent and successful
criminal justice system under formal, constitutional law with only civil
cases remaining within the informal justice system and 
procedures., 30 2
8. Views of Rule of Law Development Work in Afghanistan
Respondents were blunt in their assessments of their own and
others' rule of law efforts in Afghanistan. One respondent stated that
"[rule of law efforts are] fragmented and useless. 3
0 3 Another respondent
stated, "Overall I felt that much of the ROL (rule of law) work by early
2007 had undermined stability and ROL. ' ,304  Many respondents
criticized the United States' efforts specifically. For example, one
respondent stated that "[tlhe entire American work there is a huge
299. Survey Respondent #8, supra note 266 (country deleted for confidentiality).
300. See id. #10.
301. Id.#1l.
302. This particular respondent had no prior rule of law development experience
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interagency fight for turf., 30 5  Other respondents criticized specific
actions of the Italians, the British, and the U.N. One respondent stated,
"I cannot begin to tell you how little regard I had for the U.N. and
U.N.D.P. [the United Nations Development Program]. They somehow
managed to consistently hire people who were kids or were non-
performing.,
30 6
The assessments of rule of law work in Afghanistan as a collective
enterprise were no better. One respondent stated, "[M]y overall
impression of rule of law development work in Afghanistan was quite
negative. Most projects were lightweight and unfocused., 30 7 That same
respondent further discussed the overall situation in Afghanistan:
You cannot imagine how little capacity there was in the country after
so many years of war. I did an assessment of provincial prosecutors
and found that less than [a third] were educated beyond high school.
Almost 50% had less than a high school education. Where do you
start when you're training working professionals with no real
education in anything, let alone law?.
Some respondents interpreted the question as asking about the
general state of rule of law in Afghanistan and not as an evaluation of
donor assistance efforts. Of those responses, one commented, "[P]eople
don't care about written law. They care about customs only. 30 9 Another
responded that the general state of rule of law is "[v]ery bad, extremely
poor and most of the authorities are not willing to learn.,
310
Many respondents commented on the lack of coordination within
the international development community. As one respondent said, "We
have many on our team [who] have served in Bosnia, Serbia, Iraq,
Kosovo, and Macedonia and they all say that they have never seen so
much waste or lack of coordination as they see in Afghanistan.,
31 1
Some respondents criticized the mode of ongoing project activities.
For example, one respondent said: "The international community is
training only. They are not responsible for monitoring and
,,312evaluation. One respondent criticized the process of legislative
development saying, "I was utterly outraged by the inattention to
democratic, participatory processes in the development of statutes by




309. Survey Respondent #6, supra note 266.
310. Id. #14.
311. This response was in a cover letter attached to a returned survey (on file with
author).
312. Survey Respondent #15, supra note 266.
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donor projects. Many had little, if any, meaningful input from local
counterparts. 313
Several of the respondents criticized the rewriting of laws. One
respondent said:
In my view, crime control in post-conflict countries is critical and it
is routinely crippled by so-called comprehensive reforms written by
international experts. International experts should never undertake a
complete re-write of a criminal procedure code in a post-conflict
country. . . . They should add selected, new provisions on
investigative techniques and the elements required to meet human
rights standards to the existing code, re-writing only those provisions
that absolutely have to be changed to conform to the sections that are
added. Delay complete re-writes until much later in the development
314process.
Additionally, some of the respondents expressed concern about their
fellow rule of law providers and advisors. As one stated, "Law reform
people in Afghanistan have not the slightest awareness of how different
Afghan culture is to anything European; [h]ow the state plays little to no
role in the great majority of peoples' lives and the overall consequences
of this on their view of law."315
Many of the respondents commented on the political nature of
international development work. One respondent stated, "Countries and
organizations with projects in Afghanistan want to report back to their
respective superiors that their work is effective in building democracy for
the nation. 3 16 Another stated that "[t]he work was of little importance.
Looking like important work was being done was important. Pictures
with local judges, prosecutors, village leaders were important. The
program [itself] was of little importance.' 317 That respondent went on to
say that the substance of the training did not matter "as long as we could
say at the end that we have trained a certain number of [legal
personnel]. 318
9. Views about Valuable Projects in Afghanistan
When asked what kinds of projects or activities constituted valuable
rule of law work in Afghanistan, five of the respondents declined to





317. Survey Respondent #1, supra note 266.
318. Id. #1 (deleting specific category of personnel for confidentiality).
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projects they were working on were highly valuable, and some
commented that they did not see other projects so they could not give
examples. Additionally, one respondent stated that it "is not realistic to
evaluate programs over short time frames" and therefore gave no
answer.
319
Of those who found valuable rule of law work in Afghanistan, at
least one respondent pointed to the Afghan Constitution as being "well
done. '320 Others gave some very specific examples of valuable rule of
law work in Afghanistan. For instance, one respondent noted that
"bringing lawyers to prison in Lashkar Gah to speak to prisoners" was
successful because it gave the prisoners access to legal advice.32' Several
respondents cited specific training programs as valuable, with one
respondent noting, "I think ... in-depth and systematic training is
essential to strengthen [rule of law]. 322 Another respondent gave an
example of one valuable training program that worked well because
"senior Afghan experts" lectured on Afghan law, and international
trainers only taught international standards of law.323 The respondent
said that such an approach to training was "a strong combination. 324
Additionally, anti-corruption work also featured in some of the examples
of successful rule of law work mentioned by respondents. According to
one respondent, a valuable project would be the following:
Implementation of PRR (Priority Reform and Restructuring) in the
Attorney General's Office through the [European Commission]
would immediately increase salaries of prosecutors to a living wage.
As a consequence, law enforcement officers would not need
corruption to sustain their families. Confidence in the enforcement of
law would raise the respect towards the judiciary and prosecution and
beginning to increase trust in the rule of law.
325
Although the question specifically asked for positive examples, many of
the respondents seemed unable to focus on positive examples and spoke
of negative examples and structural problems preventing success, such as
lack of coordination and limited budgets relative to the needs. One
respondent started by saying that "[a]ll programs done by international
organizations are useful in their own place." 326 However, the same
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regulations and institutions. There are conflicting and [divergent] laws
and regulations without clear direction. Laws are made without need and
impact assessment.,
327
10. Examples of Rule of Law Projects with "No Value"
When asked about rule of law projects with "no value," some
respondents objected to the wording of the question because, as one
asked, "[H]ow do you measure that?" 328 Three respondents did not
answer the question, and one simply said "none. 3 29 One respondent said
"Legal Reforming projects carried by USAID Organizations" (sic).
330
One respondent offered a "[n]o comment" and said, "I just would prefer
not to commit to writing" examples of bad projects.331 That respondent
did, however, state that a "generic example" of a project with no value
would be one where the donor cut funds by a significant percent or
imposed unrealistic time frames for completion. 332 That respondent
said, "I understand not sacrificing the good to the perfect, but in
Afghanistan there is a lot of sacrifici[ng] ... the satisfactory and
competent to the purely schlock.
333
Many of the respondents criticized the general policy approach and
framework within which rule of law work was being undertaken. One
respondent said, "In the absence of a coherent plan for national or even
regional development virtually every program... in Kabul is doomed in
the middle to longer term., 334 Another respondent said, "[T]he idea that
more money means better progress [is] incorrect. More money means
more corruption. Afghanistan has little capacity to absorb what the
international community brings to it."'335 That respondent did criticize
some specific programs including those that gave material aid as those
items "disappeared with the head of the institution once he was
replaced.,336 The same respondent also stated that "study tours are more
of a vacation, rather than an actual learning process. 33 7
327. Id.
328. Id. #10.
329. Survey Respondent #5, supra note 266. The respondent stated, "[N]one were of









850 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:3
Several of the respondents were critical of training programs, either
specific training programs or the general approach. One respondent
criticized "the training of judicial/legal personnel 3 38 because the
programs were expensive, provided only "basic training," 339 and the
results have "been often really poor" 340 in "transfer of knowledge.,
341
One respondent singled out a commercial law legislative drafting project
as a poor example because it was done "without due regard for
participation or Shari'a compliance issues. 342
11. Recommendations to Policy-Makers Regarding Rule of Law
Work in Afghanistan
The respondents in this survey reacted in a variety of ways to the
complicated question of what advice they would give those responsible
for rule of law development policy in Afghanistan. Only a few of the
respondents agreed with each other on any given point. They offered no
uniform opinion or suggestion; however, their replies were uniformly
critical of existing policies and seemed to recognize the need to change
the approach to rule of law development work in Afghanistan. One
respondent did not answer this question.3 43 Another respondent said
simply, "I don't know., 344  The remaining answers ranged from the
simple "organize, 345 "co-ordinate with existing stakeholders, 346 or
",347"ignore the IMF, to more complex responses.
Two of the respondents suggested that the focus should be on crime
control, security, and corruption. One respondent stated, "Address
security and corruption aggressively. Without those two issues
successfully addressed, we will never win over the confidence of the
people, nor their hearts [and] minds... [and] we will have another Viet
Nam. ' '348  Two of the respondents suggested focusing on basic
infrastructure. As one respondent said,
The entire system in Afghanistan is in shambles. The law schools,
the courts, the police and prosecutors and even the laws, so the
question is where to start. . .. Afghanistan first needs some sort of
338. Id. #12.
339. Id.






346. Survey Respondent #10, supra note 266.
347. Id. #18.
348. Id. #11 (emphasis in original).
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better infrastructure-roads, clean water, electricity, schools. Once
some of this is done people may have the energy to work on rule of
law.
349
Several respondents mentioned the need to focus on education both at a
basic level and with the law faculties.
Many of the respondents criticized the hiring practices of rule of
law donors and implementing organizations (both governmental and non-
governmental). One respondent suggested that the high salaries are not
necessarily attracting the most qualified and devoted international
personnel.35 ° One respondent advised organizations to "[b]ring in better
qualified people to lead programs."35' Some of the respondents were
critical of the attitude of some rule of law development professionals. As
,,352one respondent stated, "It would be helpful if outsiders listened more.
Another respondent stated, "[I]t is better to have no project than to have a
project with unqualified or inflexible foreign staff., 353 Other respondents
suggested that organizations provide better training to their international
staff. One respondent suggested that prosecutors coming from common
law jurisdictions should get training in "prosecution in civil law
traditions. 354 This same respondent suggested six weeks of language
training before going to any post-conflict country, including
Afghanistan.355
In contrast to the concerns about high pay for internationals, several
respondents suggested better pay for Afghans, including payment to
attend training and participate in working groups. As one respondent
stated, "One problem is that no one within the system is paid a living
wage, so they often supplement their salaries with bribes. 3 56
Several respondents also criticized the short-term focus of funders
combined with their need to measure and evaluate projects after
relatively short time frames. One respondent complained that the short
time frames are "ridiculous '357 and require measuring every quarter
"while most technical legal assistance in Afghanistan has a significant
generational component., 358 That respondent went on to say that rule of
law development programs are "confronting a set of issues that will
349. Id. #1.
350. See id. #3.
351. Id. #19.
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require [one or two] generations (ten years for the easy stuff, 30 for [the]
harder [issues]). 359
Several respondents criticized the large budgets for such short time
frames. One respondent suggested "revising expenditure policies ' 360 and
"[a]iming at more limited (but achievable) results in the short term."36 '
One respondent recommended that donors should not "fall all over each
other trying to give money and support to the Afghan government.
3 62
Another criticized "throwing $100 million"363 over a five-year period
instead of "$10 or $20 million over 25 or 50 years, consistently and
reliably applied., 364 That same respondent put the costs of rule of law
development work in context, saying, "The entire three year cost of my
program is about equivalent to the cost of [two] cruise missiles. When I
am asked how effective my program is, I point this out and ask, at that
cost, how effective does it have to be?,
365
Related to the concern about short time frames and evaluation of
projects and programs was the concern expressed by several respondents
that the goals of projects as a whole are not realistic for Afghanistan. As
one respondent said, "Get real: you can't do it all in terms of the rule of
law needs of Afghanistan and the society can't absorb all the
change.... ,,366
D. Survey Summary
The survey responses paint a vivid, albeit largely anecdotal, picture
of the troubled rule of law development effort in Afghanistan. Few of
the respondents had anything positive to say about either their work in
Afghanistan or the work of other rule of law development projects.
Respondents noted the lack of international coordination within the
development community and the waste and duplication this creates.
Respondents were critical of their fellow development workers and how
many fail to understand the historical and cultural context in
Afghanistan. Many of the respondents also commented on the lack of
longer-term vision. They criticized donors' demands that their projects
"deliver results" within what they considered to be unrealistically short










2013] THE FLAWED U.S. APPROACH TO RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT 853
considered the most realistic time frames in the context of Afghanistan to
be "generational" or "multi-generational."
For all of the strongly worded complaints and blunt suggestions,
perhaps what is most interesting is what was missing. Specifically, none
of the respondents said the problem was a lack of funding. Although
many of the respondents commented on the magnitude and severity of
the problems in Afghanistan in all areas of development (not merely rule
of law), none of the respondents seemed to think that a large additional
infusion of funding or personnel would help rule of law development.
However, many respondents criticized the allocation of existing funds.
A few of the respondents seemed to question the overall approach and
whether, given the general level of development in Afghanistan, it was
appropriate to continue to spend money on rule of law development at
the expense of more basic development programs such as infrastructure,
healthcare, and education.
VI. LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN: RULE OF LAW DEVELOPMENT IN
FRAGILE NATIONS
The survey findings and the overall experience in Afghanistan over
the last decade illustrate the many challenges facing rule of law
development in a nation that is already suffering extreme poverty, lack of
basic infrastructure, a poorly developed formal legal system, extremely
low levels of literacy, and armed conflict. The main lesson from
Afghanistan is that development aid should not routinely include the full
package of rule of law development programs for countries facing these
challenges due to serious concerns about whether providing such
assistance will improve the overall level of rule of law. Instead, it may
make better sense to do only minimal rule of law development work in
certain targeted areas or, depending on the circumstances, to do other
development work first and leave the rule of law development work for
later in the development process.
A. Less is More: Limiting Assistance for Rule of Law Development
As was discussed in Part III, rule of law aid providers gave
Afghanistan the full package of rule of law assistance programs and
projects. 36' Although rule of law assistance providers aimed to provide
this assistance in a way that was appropriate and targeted to the
circumstances in Afghanistan, this targeting was not done with a look at
the big picture and what might be considered realistic projects for clear
results in the medium term (ten years or more). In countries facing
367. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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challenges similar to those in Afghanistan, such as a lack of basic
infrastructure and extreme poverty, it could make better sense to limit the
type of rule of law development assistance.368 This recommendation
would mean that donors and aid providers would need to move away
from the tendency to focus on overhauling the entire formal legal system,
including an aggressive legislative reform agenda, and replace it with
other approaches.
Development organizations and agencies have recently begun to
recognize the importance of development in what are often termed
"fragile and conflict-affected states."369  This recognition has led to
writing strategic documents recommending that, because development
work in these nations is different, how aid is given should be approached
differently.370  In 2005, USAID put forward their "Fragile States
Strategy," stating that "[i]t is guided by the overarching principle that we
need to engage carefully and selectively. [The strategy] recognizes that
there are countries where our assistance may not be able to make a
difference. '3 71  However, this recognition that development work in
fragile nations is different has not yet meant that there is a clear direction
regarding what kinds of development assistance works best in such
environments, nor an answer on how rule of law development assistance
fits into the overall picture.372 Nonetheless, the various strategies share
the common idea that rule of law is an important part of such efforts.
373
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) developed "Principles for Good International Engagement in
Fragile States. '374 Richard Zajac Sannerholm suggests building from the
368. See Deval Desai et al., Rethinking Justice Reform in Fragile and Conflict-
Affected States: The Capacity of Development Agencies and Lessons from Liberia and
Afghanistan, 3 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV. 241, 260-61 (2012).
369. Id. at 241.
370. See id. The U.N. Development Program, the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, the European Commission, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
France, and Germany are part of this process. Id.
371. USAID, FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY, at v (2005), available at
http://l.usa.gov/XdZrBr [hereinafter FRAGILE STATES].
372. See Desai et al., supra note 368, at 242-47. This is not to suggest that there are
not focus areas. For example, USAID has four principles for work in fragile states:
"engage strategically," "focus on sources of fragility," "seek short-term impact linked to
longer-term structural reform," and "establish appropriate measurement systems."
FRAGILE STATES, supra note 371, at 5-6.
373. See Desai et al., supra note 368, at 243. USAID states, "Where possible, support
reforms within government institutions, particularly those responsible for the rule of law,
core social services, and food security." FRAGILE STATES, supra note 371, at 7. There is
no definition of "where possible."
374. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD INTERNATIONAL
ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES & SITUATIONS (Apr. 2007), available at
http://bit.ly/127ozt6 [hereinafter INT'L ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES]. These principles are
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OECD's ideas, combining them with the concept of "Good Enough
Governance" to develop a "guiding framework" for rule of law work in
crisis and post-conflict countries.375 Supported by the UK Department
for International Development (DffD), "Good Enough Governance"
focuses on "core functions" that the state should meet in the area of rule
of law instead of trying to fix everything at once.376 Under this approach,
rule of law assistance providers would not focus on highly controversial
areas, areas that would affect the power balance, or areas that are beyond
the ability of the particular country to absorb or change in the near
future.377 This approach might include focusing on legal education and
improving skills and infrastructure (such as case management systems)
within the existing structures, and foregoing building new courthouses or
trying to put into place new legal institutions (such as human rights
ombudsman). It may also include foreign donors exercising restraint and
not putting pressure on the country to reform every major law. Under
this approach, donors should target a few areas, such as new laws
allowing for commercial arbitration-if it is not already allowed-
without rewriting the entire commercial code or civil procedure code.378
The advantage of reducing the amount of rule of law assistance (and
instead targeting it in a few areas) is that it will lower expectations both
within the country itself and in the international donor community.
379
"[intended] to complement the partnership commitments set out in the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness." Id.
375. Rickard Zajac Sannerholm, In Search of a User Manual: Promoting the Rule of
Law in Unruly Lands (2007), reprinted in RULE OF LAW PROMOTION, supra note 241, at
189,205-08.
376. Id. at 206. DflD has six criteria for this approach:
[1] selectivity, focusing only on the major causes of instability and the main
capacities of the state; [2] achieving visible results in the short term, however
modest, to build momentum for future reform; [3] avoiding the most politically
or socially controversial issues; [4] avoiding reforms that are too ambitious for
the implementation capacity of the country; [5] ensuring that reform does not
erode whatever capacity already exists; and [6] strengthening accountability
and legitimacy of government whenever possible.
Id.
377. Id. at 206-08.
378. This recommendation assumes that an assessment has been completed to
determine whether the new law is needed or whether the existing framework would be
sufficient for now. One example is in the area of human trafficking. Every criminal code
includes the acts that constitute human trafficking, such as kidnapping, assault, and
sexual assault. While it is clearly easier to prosecute human trafficking with specific
code sections for a crime that often involves many acts, the lack of such a section does
not prohibit prosecution of human trafficking. The question is whether the law is "good
enough," not whether it is a model.
379. USAID has as one of its four core principles "seek short-term impact" because
"experience demonstrates that without short-term, visible impact, a fragile situation is
likely to continue to deteriorate." FRAGILE STATES, supra note 371, at 6.
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Both donors and recipients expect significant and quick changes when
large amounts of money and large projects are conducted. In the context
of a country facing serious poverty, a lack of infrastructure, and a lack of
lawyers and judges, a conscious decision to give limited rule of law
development aid may keep expectations more realistic and decrease
"donor fatigue." 380 For the recipients, setting small and attainable goals
may help slowly build trust in the formal legal system, rather than
reinforcing the existing mistrust.
The problems with this suggestion will be deciding where and how
to target such assistance and getting donors to agree. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the existing frameworks, such as the OECD's "Principles
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations,"
are broadly worded and subject to varying interpretations in terms of
what kind of aid might comply with the principles. 381 Deciding what
type of limited assistance makes sense is not easy, particularly
considering how little is understood about what types of assistance bring
positive change towards rule of law in any environment, but particularly
in a fragile state.382 The absence of any clear evidence of what types of
assistance works better will contribute to disagreement among donors
about what type of assistance to focus on, even if they agree with the
idea to limit the overall rule of law assistance to a particular country.
Some donors may think that supporting top-down structures, such as
courts, is where the focus should be. Others may want to focus on
traditional or customary justice or more bottom-up approaches.383
Without clear ideas of what works, there is a tendency to want to "do
something," which in the end may actually be destructive to the
development of rule of law.384 Another challenge is illustrated in
Afghanistan: even when there are attempts to coordinate rule of law
development assistance, donors will do as they please and are not
constrained by the efforts to coordinate.385
It could be useful to develop a set of guiding principles for limited
rule of law development assistance to aid the process of deciding how
380. DflD describes donor fatigue as "achieving visible results in the short term,
however modest, to build momentum for future reform." Sannerholm, supra note 375, at
206.
381. See INT'L ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES, supra note 374.
382. See discussion supra Part III.
383. See supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
384. An example here is support to customary justice in Afghanistan. See
MacKenzie, supra note 204. For an example of the "do something" thinking, see Desai
et al., supra note 368, at 260 (recommending that donors do "experimental programs" in
fragile countries, or "pilot programs," as part of trying to determine what might work
before engaging in larger scale work).
385. See discussion supra Part IH.B.
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and where to limit assistance.386 These principles could include both the
conditions that should lead to their adoption in a particular country-
such as endemic poverty, lack of infrastructure, minimal institutional
development, and overall low socio-economic indicators including high
rates of illiteracy-and suggest areas for the initial focus of rule of law
aid under such circumstances. Due to the current focus on rule of law in
the U.N. and other multi-lateral organizations, it is unlikely that such
organizations will find it politically possible to develop such a set of
guiding principles because doing so would likely suggest the appearance
of downgrading the importance of rule of law in general.387 There is also
a continuing tendency by inter-governmental organizations, such as the
World Bank, to see rule of law as the solution to problems in fragile
states, without clear direction as to how international assistance providers
can contribute to developing rule of law in such circumstances.388
It is therefore more realistic, although far from easy, to focus on one
donor: the United States. As stated before, the United States could exert
significant influence on other donors and organizations if it decided to
change how it conducts rule of law development assistance.389 Even if
others continued "business as usual," such a change would mean that the
United States would be adopting policies that reflect lessons learned and
would thereby provide more meaningful assistance without repeating the
same mistakes. The challenge within the United States is that at least
four departments provide rule of law development assistance. 390 But
even if just one of those departments, such as the U.S. Agency for
International Development, changed its process and developed a version
of the Guiding Principles for Limited Rule of Law Engagement, or
simply revised its Fragile States Strategy391 to include specific
recommendations on rule of law development in such countries, it could
have a significant impact on how rule of law assistance is given by U.S.
386. See Sannerholm, supra note 375, at 189. "Surprisingly little attention has been
given to the normative boundaries for post-conflict rule of law reform. There is no
international framework for organising and implementing rule of law activities in post-
conflict societies." Id. at 191.
387. See, e.g., GUIDANCE NOTE, supra note 72.
388. "The president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, has argued that 'a
fundamental prerequisite for sustainable development [in fragile and conflict-affected
states] is an effective rule of law,' using this as a rallying cry for broader development
engagement injustice reform in [fragile and conflict-affected states]." Desai et al., supra
note 368, at 242.
389. As the situation in Afghanistan illustrates, the United States is often the largest
donor and may exercise great influence for this reason. See supra note 91- 93 and
accompanying text.
390. These departments include the Department of State, Department of Justice,
Department of Defense, and USAID. See supra note 94.
391. FRAGILE STATES, supra note 371.
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donors.392 The challenge, even with just one donor such as the United
States, is that the decision to give foreign aid to a particular country is a
political and policy level decision. Although it could be argued that
deciding what type of assistance to give to a particular country is simply
a technical decision, it has serious political connotations. That is,
declaring a country ready for only limited rule of law assistance creates
practical political difficulties that may interfere with the overall foreign
policy goals for a particular country.393  However, this practical
constraint, which may prevent full implementation of such a change in
policy, should not impede at least the concept's development.394
B. Stop Rule of Law Development Aid
The second suggestion may be even more politically difficult to
implement but is one that deserves serious consideration: rule of law
development workers and policy-makers should recognize that there can
be circumstances when it does not make sense to give any rule of law
development assistance in the context of an overall development
assistance effort. Deciding to accept this proposal does not mean that
policy-makers and rule of law development workers are stating that rule
of law does not matter or that it is not an important goal. Rather, this
suggestion recognizes that rule of law development assistance is a highly
complicated form of assistance that requires a society that is ready, on a
number of levels, to make meaningful changes. Just as Abraham
Maslow recognized that there are "higher and lower needs" in human
development, there is also a "Hierarchy of Needs" in the international
development context.395 If the average person in a particular country is
struggling for basic survival because of either endemic poverty or armed
conflict, it is unrealistic to expect them to focus on more theoretical
392. One challenge is that it is highly political to declare a state "fragile" and,
therefore, to impose the Fragile States Strategy approach. USAID funding and aid
programs in Afghanistan, not to mention funding and assistance from other U.S.
government sources, for example, has clearly not been constrained by the Fragile States
Strategy. See supra notes 83-157 and accompanying text; FRAGILE STATES, supra note
371.
393. Afghanistan is a prime example of this struggle. See supra note 392.
394. One recent example of the United States changing its approach to development is
the Millennium Challenge. See About MCC, MILLENIUM CHALLENGE CORP.,
http://www.mcc.gov/pages/about (last visited Feb. 12, 2013). The Millennium Challenge
is a stand-alone aid program that does not change the overall U.S. approach to giving
development assistance, but rather acts as a supplemental approach, which distinguishes
it from the suggestion to change the overall approach. However, despite criticism and
concerns about the Millennium Challenge, it exemplifies that it is possible for the United
States to take a different approach towards development assistance.
395. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 97-104 (2d ed. 1970).
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concepts or higher-level needs such as rule of law development. Rule of
law development demands that individual citizens, and legal
professionals, have a certain attitude including that they believe in the
legitimacy of their legal system and agree to follow the law.396
There are two basic reasons not to engage in rule of law
development assistance in fragile countries: it is not money well spent
and it may ultimately do harm to individuals and to the development of
rule of law. Donors have limited funds for development in any given
country. That money is better spent on basic needs in countries such as
Afghanistan.397 The second concern is the harm that rule of law
development projects may have in such an environment. For example,
the United States built 40 courthouses in Afghanistan. 398 By most
accounts, many of these courts were not used or quickly went into
disrepair.399 Under these circumstances, the average Afghan likely sees
these newly constructed courthouses as monuments to the formal justice
system's failure. This view does not help develop an attitude of trust in
the formal legal system. There can also be more immediate harms to the
average Afghan trust in the formal legal system. For instance, trust may
be further diminished when the international community is responsible
for building jails and expanding the police force, and such increased
capacity to enforce the law is used not to decrease crime but rather to
imprison people and collect bribes for their release.400 As previously
stated, there are also serious concerns about the harm that supporting the
informal justice sector in Afghanistan might be doing to the individuals
who face abusive treatment from those processes and to the overall
development of rule of law and trust in Afghanistan's formal justice
system.4 °1
Rule of law development scholars are questioning some of the
assumptions implicit in large-scale aid efforts, and there is a large and
growing body of literature critical of aid given for state-building, peace-
building, and governance operations.402  Peace-making and
396. For more extensive discussions on the importance of legitimacy and attitudes of
the public in the context of rule of law development, see Alkon, Lost in Translation,
supra note 63, at 171-74; Alkon, Plea Bargaining as Legal Transplant, supra note 218, at
377-84.
397. However, under most bureaucratic structures, it is not easy to shift money from
one developmental sector to another, for example, taking money from rule of law
development and putting it into education or healthcare development assistance.
398. INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 12, at 43.
399. See REFORMING AFGHANISTAN'S BROKEN JUDICIARY, supra note 90, at 25.
400. See supra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
402. See generally TRENKOV-WERMUTH, supra note 46 (studying U.N. governance
operations and how the U.N. handled legal and judicial reform, focusing on Kosovo and
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democratization scholars question the impact of moving quickly towards
elections and question how realistic general democratization work can be
without strong local institutions.4 3  These democratization studies
criticize the free market democracy approach that focuses on introducing
free market capitalism while moving quickly towards elections and
democratic forms of government. 40 4 This literature instead argues for
"sequencing": the idea that countries should work on rule of law and a
fully functional state first and only later focus on democratization.4 °5
Thomas Carothers, however, criticizes this approach, stating that it
is based on the mistaken assumption that "autocrats can and will act as
generators of rule of law development and state-building" and that a
country in the process of democratizing is not able to do these tasks.40 6
Nonetheless, the "sequencing" debate focuses on the question of whether
to do rule of law development alongside democratization work, or just
focus on developing strong institutions and rule of law.407 Those who
have engaged in this debate are not looking at this question in the context
of the most fragile countries in the world, such as Afghanistan. Those
who support "rule of law first" also tend to ignore how rule of law is
developed and how little we understand about it; those who support this
approach instead focus on the problems with democratization and the
perceived push for elections.40 8
East Timor); ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR'S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT
(2004) (relaying a study of peace-building operations in the 1990s and concluding that
the record of success was limited); RICHARD J. PONzIO, DEMOCRATIC PEACEBUILDING:
AIDING AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER FRAGILE STATES (2011) (describing a study focused on
Afghanistan that critiques the impact of international aid and peace-building efforts on
political and institutional development in the country).
403. See, e.g., EDWARD D. MANSFIELD & JACK SNYDER, ELECTING TO FIGHT: WHY
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES Go To WAR 7 (2005) ("[I]ncomplete transitions from autocracy
toward democracy are fraught with the danger of violent conflict in states whose political
institutions are weak.").
404. See, e.g., MANSFIELD & SNYDER, supra note 403; CHUA, supra note 129; FAREED
ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD
(2007).
405. Democratization in this context refers to assistance for elections and democratic
forms of governing. See generally CHUA, supra note 129; ZAKARIA, supra note 404.
406. Thomas Carothers, The "Sequencing" Fallacy, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 12, 14 (2007).
407. See, e.g., MANSFIELD & SNYDER, supra note 403, at 18. But see John W.
Harbeson, Post-Millennium U.S. Aid for Africa: Reconciling Freedom and Security,
Theirs and Ours, in FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 33, at 239 (arguing, in
part, that promotion of democracy strengthens fiagile states).
408. See generally MANSFIELD & SNYDER, supra note 403 (mentioning the importance
of rule of law and how it should come first alongside institutional development and other
factors, such as the development of a national identity, but focusing the discussion on war
in (and between) newly democratizing states); CHUA, supra note 129 (focusing not on rule
of law development, but on elections and free market capitalism).
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In the context of the sequencing debate, Thomas Carothers argues
against a sequence, or priority, for such work and suggests instead a
policy of "gradualism" that would focus on "building democracy slowly
in certain contexts, but not avoiding it or putting it off indefinitely. ' 409
Carothers suggests that there are five factors that should be considered
"core facilitators or nonfacilitators" that make democratization "harder or
easier" but not "certain or impossible. ' 4 10 These factors include: (1) the
level of economic development; (2) the concentration of sources of
national wealth; (3) identity-based divisions; (4) historical experience
with political pluralism; and (5) nondemocratic neighborhoods.4 11
State-building and peace-making scholars are critically examining
efforts in Afghanistan and questioning the fundamental assumption of
whether to provide state-building assistance. These scholars are also
examining what kinds of aid make sense.4 12 However, most studies
include only a passing reference to rule of law and do not focus on this
subcategory of aid.413 Therefore, as thoughtful as many of these studies
are about the big issues of democratization assistance and peace-
building, they tend to give only cursory analysis to rule of law
development work and instead accept the mantra that rule of law is
necessary.4 14 Generally, these studies do not clearly distinguish between
countries that remain fully sovereign and, in that case, how rule of law
development work might be different in such countries compared to
countries that receive aid as part of a governance or peace-building
operation.4 15
409. Carothers, The "Sequencing" Fallacy, supra note 406, at 14.
410. Id.at 24.
411. Id.
412. See Astri Suhrke, The Dangers of a Tight Embrace: Externally Assisted
Statebuilding in Afghanistan, in THE DILEMMAS OF STATEBUILDING, supra note 137, at
227 (criticizing the lack of "critical thinking about the basic framework of international
involvement and the underlying assumption that, on balance, it clearly has a positive
effect").
413. See generally id.; BUILDING STATES TO BUILD PEACE (Charles T. Call & Vanessa
Wyeth eds., 2008) (focusing on rule of law in one of the book's 15 chapters); PARIS,
supra note 402; NATION-BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ (Francis Fukuyama
ed., 2006); MICHAEL McFAUL, ADVANCING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: WHY WE SHOULD AND
How WE CAN (2010); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD
ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004). But see PONZIO, supra note 402 (analyzing rule of
law within the context of democratization).
414. As Thomas Carothers observed in 1998, "One cannot get through a foreign
policy debate these days without someone proposing the rule of law as the solution to the
world's troubles." THOMAS CAROTHERS, The Rule of Law Revival, in CRITICAL MISSION:
ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 121, 121 (2004).
415. See, e.g., PARIS, supra note 402 (using case studies from states in both categories
such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, and
Kosovo); PONZIO, supra note 402, at 72 (defining "five broad types of peace operations").
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Scholars in economic development and other more traditional forms
of foreign assistance are also asking questions about what works and
whether the development programs are in fact assisting the "bottom
billion" to move out of dire poverty.416 These studies question some of
the assumptions inherent in economic development work and offer
suggestions of what approaches might make better sense.417 William
Easterly cautions against grand utopian goals, suggesting "the aim should
be to make individuals better off, not transform governments or
societies." 418 Economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo argue for a
"patient, step-by-step ' 419 approach to fight poverty and make aid more
effective; they caution that there are "no magic bullets to eradicate
poverty.1
420
Legal scholars are also questioning the value of rule of law
development work. Law and development scholars have a long history
of critical analysis of this type of work.421 Scholars in this field have
criticized aid providers for being, at best, overly naive and missing key
416. See generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE
WEST'S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD
(2006); PAUL COLLIER, THE BoTroM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE
FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007); WHAT WORKS IN DEVELOPMENT?:
THINKING BIG AND THINKING SMALL (Jessica Cohen & William Easterly eds., 2009). For
a critique of the unintended and potentially debilitating consequences of food aid in
Somalia, see MICHAEL MAREN, THE ROAD TO HELL: THE RAVAGING EFFECTS OF FOREIGN
AID AND INTERNATIONAL CHARITY (1997).
417. One suggestion is to focus aid on those countries where the poorest billion
people live. COLLIER, supra note 416, at 189-90. Supporting a market approach, Collier
states, "Poverty is not romantic. The countries of the bottom billion are not there to
pioneer experiments in socialism; they need to be helped along the already trodden path
of building market economies." Id. at 191.
418. EASTERLY, supra note 416, at 368. Easterly offers six "basic principles" to
improve aid but cautions that "none of these suggestions is the Big Answer to world
poverty, or even how to fix foreign aid." Id. at 382.
419. ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL
RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY 16 (2011).
420. Id. at 268. Banerjee and Duflo review numerous studies and examine what has
worked and what has not worked in economic development. They conclude that there are
"five key lessons" to improve the lives of the poor. These lessons are: "the poor often
lack critical pieces of information and believe things that are not true"; "the poor bear
responsibility for too many aspects of their lives"; there are good reasons that some
markets are missing for the poor, or that the poor face unfavorable prices in them"; "poor
countries are not doomed to failure because they are poor"; "expectations about what
people are able or unable to do all too often end up turning into self-fulfilling
prophecies." Id. at 268-73.
421. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 23; JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM:
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980); David M. Trubek and
Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062. For a more
recent critique, see THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3.
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understandings, 422 or, at worst, exporting a form of imperialism.
423
Scholarship and critiques of law and development focus on how law can
affect economic development, including poverty reduction.424 The
critiques, however, have looked less at questions such as whether rule of
law development work can improve the human rights situation or can aid
in conflict prevention or peace-making.425
One critic, Brian Z. Tamanaha, concludes that foreign assistance
does not change the process of legal development in any country.426
Therefore, Tamanaha suggests that shutting down rule of law
development projects around the world would not have much impact on
legal systems in countries currently receiving such aid because they
would continue to function as they are.427 In Tamanaha's view, there
would simply be fewer training programs, fewer trips abroad, and less
money for training, computerization, and salaries.42 8 Tamanaha also
predicts that, without the "artificial boost ' 429 of current rule of law
development projects, legal development would start to build from local
agendas and would be run by people who understand the context in
which the current legal system operates and through which change must
proceed.43°
Tamanaha's analysis is prescriptive by focusing on what should be
done in the future for rule of law projects. He focuses on the key
question of whether the international community should fund such
projects. Assuming that it is unrealistic to expect rule of law
development work to cease in the near future, it is still possible to build
from Tamanaha's analysis by looking at when, and under what
422. For a general critique of how aid was given in the early years after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, see JANINE R. WEDEL, COLLISION AND COLLUSION: THE
STRANGE CASE OF WESTERN AID TO EASTERN EUROPE (2001). For a critique of rule of
law assistance, see GARDNER, supra note 421; see also Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?:
United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-
Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 179 (1999).
423. See generally UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW
IS ILLEGAL (2008).
424. See, e.g., THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3. For a
summary of the history of the law and development movement and thoughts about the
future, see David M. Trubeck, The Owl and the Pussy-Cat: Is there Future for "Law and
Develoment"?, 25 WIS. INT'L L. J. 235 (2007). For an analysis of the law and
development's movement away from economic and market reform to more "social"
issues, see Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation
Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 199 (2004).
425. See supra note 424.
426. See Tamanaha, supra note 23, at 241-42.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 242.
429. Id. at 242.
430. Id. at 241-43.
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circumstances, international donors should exclude rule of law
development assistance from their aid package to a particular country.
The lesson of Afghanistan is that the international donor community
needs to ask the threshold question of whether to provide rule of law
development assistance before engaging in any assistance effort and
should not assume that it must be a part of any overall development
program.
Thomas Carothers provides a useful typology of key "facilitators or
nonfacilitators" for democratization.431 The concept of facilitators or
nonfacilitators may also be applied to rule of law development and, in
this context, the facilitators and non-facilitators are: (1) if a country is in
armed conflict; (2) if its socioeconomic development is extraordinarily
low; (3) if it has low levels of institutional/political development; and
(4) if the recipient country has a low functioning or nominally existing
formal legal system.432 Having one or more of these conditions should
not automatically disqualify a country from rule of law development
assistance, but it should trigger a process to examine whether to provide
assistance at that particular time.
Of these four conditions, whether there is ongoing armed conflict is
the most serious question to consider. Rule of law development work, on
an operational level, requires peace. Rule of law development programs
and projects should be developed after assessing the current conditions
and should remain flexible to changing conditions. Rule of law
development workers should also be in a position where they can
continuously evaluate the conditions both within their individual projects
and in the country at large. If and when there is rule of law development
work, it should be conducted around the country and not restricted to
certain cities, towns, or villages. It is difficult, if not impossible, to do
these things if the country is at war. On a very simple level, if foreign
lawyers are issued flak jackets and helmets on arrival in a country, it is
not the time to send in civilian lawyers. Clearly, the peacemakers and
security forces need to finish their work first.
The goal of identifying these four conditions, based on the lessons
from Afghanistan, is to encourage critical thinking before starting large-
scale rule of law development projects. The hope is that delaying rule of
431. Carothers, The "Sequencing'" Fallacy, supra note 406, at 24.
432. Sequencing proponents talk about "preconditions" that must exist before
beginning democratization work. Those conditions include "useable state bureaucracy,
rule of law, autonomous political parties, a free and lively civil society, and an
institutionalized economic society." MANSFIELD & SNYDER, supra note 403, at 281.
Other preconditions include "political inclusion of the working class... resolution or
management of ethnic or cultural divisions ... [and] institutional infrastructure needed to
manage the turbulent processes of increased political participation .. " Id.
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law projects until the conditions are better might encourage more
thoughtful rule of law development work that, in turn, will have a more
meaningful impact. Nevertheless, the recommendation that there are
times when rule of law development assistance should not be part of the
larger assistance package does not preclude rule of law advocacy on a
political level. And, of course, it does not prevent local actors from
working towards legal reform on their own.
This suggestion has the same political limitations as when
developing Guidelines for Limited Rule of Law Assistance. Focusing on
the United States, the suggestion is to add an assessment of whether to
include rule of law development aid in the general aid package before the
United States provides rule of law development assistance in any
country. Currently, even if donors wanted to conduct such an
assessment, rule of law development workers and policy-makers have no
single tool to aid them in making the determination of whether it is
appropriate to conduct rule of law development programs in a particular
country. One option would be for USAID to develop such a baseline
assessment tool to be conducted before committing to rule of law
development programming in any particular country, using as a starting
point the four factors proposed in this article.433 Although the ultimate
decision of whether to give aid, and what aid to give, is highly politicized
and serves greater foreign policy objectives, the creation of such an
assessment tool might start the process of moving beyond the assumption
that rule of law development work is a necessary part of all development
assistance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Rule of law development assistance providers and policy-makers
should critically examine the efforts in Afghanistan and not repeat the
mistakes made there when delivering aid in other countries. Every
country that receives foreign aid deserves an individualized analysis to
determine what kind of aid makes sense in the particular context of that
nation and at the particular stage of development. This individualized
analysis must include the possibility that certain types of aid should not
be part of the process. The lesson from Afghanistan is that rule of law
development assistance should not necessarily be a part of a general
433. There are also non-governmental organizations, including the American Bar
Association Rule of Law Initiative, that have developed numerous assessment tools. See
ABA Rule of Law Initiative, Am. BAR ASSN, http://bit.ly/XCqA2w (last visited Feb. 12,
2013). But, if such tools will be required before funding is given, they need to be created
by the U.S. Government. USAID could (and should) call on the expertise of those who
have already produced assessment tools, such as the American Bar Association.
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foreign aid package. Serious consideration should be given to when it is
timely to bring in thousands of foreign legal professionals and pay them
millions of dollars to work towards developing the legal system.
The United States could lead the way in changing policies to stop
the "standard menu" of assistance regardless of particular circumstances
in fragile and conflict-affected countries by developing a more nuanced
approach to rule of law development. The decision to provide foreign
assistance should not mean that the United States, or any other donor,
provides all types of foreign assistance-including rule of law
assistance-but rather should mean the beginning of a process to decide,
in a selective manner, what types of aid make sense for the particular
country at that particular time. In the short term, in fragile and conflict-
affected countries, it may make better sense not to provide rule of law
development assistance and focus instead on other more urgent types of
aid, while continuing to advocate on a political and policy level for
improved rule of law.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONS AND FORMAT
Survey on Rule of Law Development Work in Afghanistan
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey and return it by July
18, 2008 to the address listed at the end of this survey. All responses will
remain anonymous. The final survey results will be published in an
academic law journal.
1. Please answer the following questions for each position you have
held in Afghanistan (please include all positions including those relating
specifically to rule of law development in Afghanistan). If you have held
more than three positions, please add the information below.
Current Previous Previous
Questions: Position Position Position
What were the dates you
worked in Afghanistan?
Are you on a temporary
contract or a permanent
employee on temporary
assignment to Afghanistan?
If you are on a temporary
contract, had you worked for
that organization before your
assignment to Afghanistan?
How long was/is your contract
or assignment in Afghanistan (6
months, 1 year,
indefinite.. .etc.)
Did you extend your contract
beyond the original period? If
yes, please note for how long.
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What is the working language
of your office?









consultants) work in your
organization (please include
both international and national
staff)?
How many (or what
percentage) are lawyers?
How many (or what
percentage) are support staff?
-4- 4 4-
-4- 4 +
What is the annual rule of law
assistance budget for your
organization in Afghanistan?
What are your job
responsibilities?
Where does your program work
in Afghanistan? Please list all
cities.
2. Why did you accept your first position in Afghanistan?
3. Please list any training you received on rule of law or
Afghanistan before beginning work in Afghanistan (please include the
sponsoring organization for the training, the topic/s of the training, and
the length of the training).
4. Have you worked in rule of law development in other countries?
If yes, please list where and for how long in each place/position.
5. Have you worked in development not related to rule of law in
other countries? If yes, please list what types of development work,
where and for how long.
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6. Please list any other countries you have worked in other than
your home country, excluding those you already listed in Questions 4
and 5 (please include the type of position and length of time).
7. What do you anticipate the effect of your work in Afghanistan to
be in 1 - 5 years? 10 years and beyond?
8. What is your general opinion of rule of law development work in
Afghanistan? Please do not limit your comments to your specific project
or program.
9. Please describe what you see as the most valuable rule of law
projects or programs currently or previously done in Afghanistan and
why they are/were valuable.
10. Please describe any rule of law projects or programs currently
or previously done in Afghanistan that you thought were of no value and
why they are/were not valuable.
11. If you could advise policymakers in the international
community responsible for funding and supporting rule of law
development projects in Afghanistan, what advice would you give them?
12. Does your organization restrict your movement in the city in
which you work? If yes, please describe the restrictions placed on you.
13. How would you describe the security environment in
Afghanistan?
14. Does the security environment play a role in the planning or
implementation of rule of law development programs by your
organizations? If yes, how?
15. Does the transportation infrastructure play a role in the
planning or implementation of rule of law development programs by
your organization? If yes, how?
16. Is there anything else you think is important to understand
about planning, organizing, or implementing rule of law development
assistance in Afghanistan?
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17. Do you speak Dari?






If yes, did you speak Dari before you started working in
Afghanistan?
18. Do you speak Pashto?






If yes, did you speak Pashto before you started working in
Afghanistan?
19. Are you a lawyer?
If yes, how many years did you practice law in your home country?
If no, what are your university and/or graduate degree/s in?
How many years experience do you have working in that profession
before coming to Afghanistan?
20. What is your citizenship (if you hold more than one passport,
please list all citizenships)
21. Are you male or female?
22. What is your age?
Thank you again for taking the time to assist in this survey. Please
return the survey by July 18, 2008 to Professor Cynthia Alkon, [e-mail
and surface address information deleted]
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As stated above, all answers will remain anonymous. Please note if
you would like to receive a copy of the final article and the preferred
address (email or surface).
I would also appreciate it ifyou could pleaseforward this survey to
anyone you know who has worked in rule of law development in
Afghanistan.
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APPENDIX B: COVER LETTER
I am a law professor in the United States researching rule of law
work in Afghanistan. Attached is a survey asking you about your
experiences and views of rule of law development work in Afghanistan.
It should take you a minimum of 20-30 minutes to complete. All
responses will remain anonymous. This means I will not link your name
or organization to any specific statement. I intend to publish the results in
an academic law journal. I am hopeful that this survey will help to
provide a new perspective in the academic literature on development
work in Afghanistan. If you would like a copy of the published article,
please just let me know when you respond and please be sure to include
the email or surface address.
I would like the survey to go to as many people as possible.
Therefore, if you know of others who are or have worked in rule of law
development in Afghanistan, please either send them this survey or send
their email addresses to me so I can forward it to them. For the purposes
of this survey I am defining rule of law work very broadly.
I am happy to answer any questions you may have about the survey.
Thank you in advance for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Cynthia Alkon
Assistant Professor of Law
[additional address information deleted]
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